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Morgen mot Russlands grense 
Jeg kommer fra dagen igår,   
  fra vesten, fra fortidens land.   
  Langt fremme en solstripe går   
  mot syd. Det er morgenens rand. 
I jubel flyr toget avsted.   
  Se grensen! En linje av ild.   
  Bak den er det gamle brendt ned.   
  Bak den er det nye blitt til. 
Jeg føler forventningens sang   
  i hjertets urolige slag.   
  Så skulde jeg også engang   
  få møte den nye dag! 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This Master thesis is devoted to the image of the Russian Revolution of 1917 as it was 
presented in the press of the Norwegian labor movement in the period 1915—1923. The main 
source for the current analysis is the editorials of the newspaper Social-Demokraten.  
1.1. Major terms and choice of period 
First of all, major notions used in the title and to be extensively applied in the thesis will be 
explained, namely the Russian Revolution, the Norwegian labor movement, the Social-
Demokraten and the selection of the period 1915—1923.    
The term the Russian Revolution has a narrow and a broad definition. The narrow definition 
refers to the events occurred in Russia in 1917. It embraces both the February Revolution, 
which dismantled tsarism and led to the formation of the Provisional Government, and the 
October Revolution which resulted in the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. The broad 
definition refers to the Bolsheviks, their policies and methods on the one hand, and to the 
Communist International (the Comintern) on the other hand as the latter is considered as a 
direct outcome of the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
The term the Norwegian labor movement concerns a wide range of concepts. According to the 
first volume of a fundamental work on the history of the labor movement in Norway 
Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge
1
, the term labor movement covers political and labor 
organizations which primarily consisted of employees in industries, crafts, transport and 
construction. Furthermore, the term refers to smallholders and fishermen, the self-employed, 
craftsmen, subordinate officials and intellectuals. Three notions – the Norwegian Labor Party 
(the DNA), the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, and the Social Democratic Youth 
League of Norway – are central when discussing the term the Norwegian labor movement. 
Nevertheless, in the bibliography on the Norwegian labor movement which was utilized for 
this thesis, there has not been mentioned a clear-cut distinction between the notions of the 
Norwegian Labor Party and the Norwegian labor movement.  
The Social-Demokraten, which was directly controlled by the central leadership of the DNA, 
was an important press organ for the Norwegian labor movement. Initially the newspaper was 
established in 1884 and called Vort Arbeide. In 1886 it was renamed Social-Demokraten and 
                                                 
1
 Edvard Bull, Arbeiderklassen blir til, 1850—1900 (Oslo: Tiden), 7-13. 
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bore this name until April 1923. The paper was founded by typographer Christian Holtermann 
Knudsen. By the 1890s the newspaper‘s circulation was around 7 000. From 1912 till 1918 
the circulation nearly doubled, from 20 000 to 40 000. The Social-Demokraten became the 
biggest newspaper in Norway after Aftenposten.
2
 The peculiarity of Social-Demokraten was 
that the newspaper was controlled by the Party‘s Central Committee, and its editor was 
assigned by the Party‘s convention based on political premises. In contrast, other DNA- 
newspapers were administered by the local divisions of the party, and the editors were 
employed by the regional section.
3
 Hence, Social-Demokraten could be assumed as the 
mouthpiece for the Norwegian Labor Party. 
The choice of the period for this analysis was determined by embracing the editorship period 
of three Social-Demokraten‘s editors: Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl. The 
year of 1915 is taken as a starting point as it allows the author to trace possible changes in the 
attitudes towards Russia before and after the Revolution as well as involve the Jacob Vidnes‘ 
editorship. Furthermore, the year 1915 was marked with the arrival of one of the most 
influential Russian revolutionaries, Aleksandra Kollontai, to Norway. The period under focus 
involved such prominent events as the Russian Revolution, the DNA‘s convention of 1918 
which resulted in the leadership of the DNA‘s radical wing, affiliation of the DNA to the 
Comintern, the Party split of 1921 which led to the establishment of the Social Democratic 
Labor Party of Norway. The studied period concludes by 1
st
 April 1923, when the newspaper 
Social-Demokraten was renamed Arbeiderbladet. Moreover, the choice of the time span is 
determined by the fact that in the period 1915—1923 the labor movement in Norway was the 
strongest in Scandinavia and one of the strongest in Europe.
4
 
1.2. Research questions 
The focus of the thesis lies on the portrayal(s) of the Russian Revolution presented in the 
DNA‘s print organ the Social-Demokraten under the editorship of Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo 
and Martin Tranmæl and seeks to detect the influence of the Russian Revolution on the 
Norwegian labor movement in the period 1915—1923.  
                                                 
2
 Lars A. Døvle Larssen, ―En uforbederlig optimist‖: ―Social-Demokratens‖s utenrikspolitiske linje i Olav 
Scheflos redaktørtid 1918-1921 (Universitet i Oslo, 1996), 27-28. 
3
 Kai Arvid Køhler, ―Social-Demokraten‖ og den russiske revolusjon: en studie i hvordan påvirkningen fra den 
russiske revolusjon på splittelsesprosessen i norsk arbeiderbevegelse kom til uttrykk i ―Social-Demokraten‖ i 
tidsrommet mars 1917 til oktober 1920 (Universitetet i Bergen, 1969), 4. 
4
 See 1.6. The position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia. 
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The research questions of the thesis are: 
What attitude(s) was / were expressed towards the Russian Revolution in the Social-
Demokraten‘s editorials in 1915—1923?  
What attitude(s) was / were expressed towards revolutionary means in the Social-
Demokraten‘s editorials in 1915—1923?  
How consistent were the portrayals of the Russian Revolution under the editorship of Jacob 
Vidnes, Olav Scheflo, and Martin Tranmæl (until April 1923)? 
How did the influence of the Russian Revolution manifest itself in the Social-Demokraten‘s 
editorials in 1915—1923? 
1.3. Motivation and relevance for peace studies 
As a Russian student in Norway with a background in history, I contemplated making a 
research on the history of the relations between Norway and Russia. The countries have 
pursued relatively peaceful neighborly relations for a long period of time. But did Russia 
influence the development of the Norwegian labor movement which in turn played a crucial 
role in the political history of Norway? If yes, to what extent did it? These questions made me 
contemplate writing a thesis about the Russian Revolution and its impact on the Norwegian 
labor movement taking into account the solid position of the Labor Party in Norway. The 
labor movement in Norway was stronger than in other Scandinavian countries. The 
Norwegian Labor Party has been one of the biggest and most influential parties in Norway, 
which largely contributed to the creation of the welfare-state. The influence of the labor 
movement on peaceful conditions within Norway was considerable. It manifested itself in 
anti-war propaganda and the impact on the development of such values as equality, 
egalitarianism and democratic freedoms. Despite the fact that Russia / Soviet Union made a 
certain impact on the Norwegian labor movement, the latter has chosen its own path which 
sharply contrasted with the Bolshevik policies. 
1.4. Three editors: presentation 
As it has been mentioned above, in the period under study, the Social-Demokraten had three 
editors: Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl. In this paragraph their biographies 
and political standpoints will be described. 
4 
 
Jacob Vidnes (1875—1940) was born in the county Møre og Romsdal in Western Norway in 
the family of a farmer. Jacob Vidnes was an active member of the social democratic circles in 
Norway from his young days. In 1898 Vidnes began to work as an editorial secretary for the 
newspaper Arbeiderbladet in Christiania. A year later in 1899, when Vidnes was twenty-four 
years old, he started working for the Social-Demokraten first as a journalist and later as an 
editorial secretary in a political section. In 1900 he initiated the creation of the Social 
Democratic Youth League of Norway. Four years later he established its print organ Det 
tyvende Aarhundre. In 1912 he became an editor of the newspaper Social-Demokraten. He 
was one of the originators of the Norwegian Social Democratic Press Association, where he 
was a chairman until 1918. In March 1918 the radical wing of the DNA took leadership in the 
Party. Vidnes had to leave the position of editor on the 2 of April, 1918.
5
 In 1919 Vidnes 
joined the Social Democratic Opposition Group established in protest against the decision of 
the DNA‘s Central Committee to support the Party line on the revolutionary mass actions.
6
 
After leaving the position of the Social-Demokraten‘s editor, Vidnes was appointed as a press 
consultant in the Norwegian Press Association. Jacob Vidnes represented the reformist wing 




Olav Scheflo (1883—1943) was born in Steinkjer, the county Nord-Trøndelag. His father was 
a cab driver. Scheflo studied at Steinkjer commune school. Then he began to work as a 
seaman.
8
 At the age of twenty, he moved to Trondheim where he started writing for the 
newspaper Ny Tid. He worked there for five years. These years to a great extent determined 
the political line Scheflo would follow later. In 1910 he moved to Christiania where he started 
writing for the Social-Demokraten. In 1914 he became an editor of the newspaper Arbeidet in 
Bergen. And four years later, in 1918, when Kyrre Grepp and Martin Tranmæl‘s won a 
majority in the DNA, Scheflo was appointed as the editor for the Social-Demokraten. 
9
 He 
was recognized as the most important journalist in the Party who expressed the views of the 
Party‘s radical wing utterly and completely. The Party members perceived Scheflo as ―the 
                                                 
5
 Norsk Biografisk Leksikon, s. v. ―Vidnes.,‖ 556. 
6
 Køhler, 5.  
7
 Jorunn Bjørgum, ―Unionsoppløsningen og radikaliseringen av norsk arbeiderbevegelse,‖ Arbeiderhistorie 
(2005), 33. 
8
 Inge Scheflo, ―På nært hold,‖ in Olav Scheflo som politiker og menneske: 44 artikler og debattinnlegg av Olav 
Scheflo, ed. Inge Scheflo (Oslo: Tiden, 1974), 33. 
9
 Norsk Biografisk Leksikon, s. v. ―Scheflo.,‖ 321.  
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most prominent advocate for the International‘s standpoints.‖
10
 In 1921 the editor position 
came over to Martin Tranmæl. Scheflo became the DNA‘s representative in the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern. Furthermore, he was a representative of the Christiania Labor 
Party in the Parliament and the DNA‘s parliamentarian leader until the Party split in 1923. In 
1923—1927 shortly after the second split in the DNA, Scheflo became a member of the 
Norwegian Communist Party and the editor of its newspapers Norges Kommunistblad and 
Arbeideren. In 1929 he returned to the DNA and worked as an editor of the DNA-newspaper 
Sørlandet till 1939. Due to poor health Scheflo had to leave his job. In 1943 Scheflo died of 
heart attack.
11
     
Martin Tranmæl (1879—1967) is one of the most prominent figures in the Norwegian labor 
movement. He was born in Melhus in the Norwegian county Sør Trøndelag. In his early 
twenties, Tranmæl worked as a painter apprentice in the USA and became interested in 
revolutionary flows within the American labor movement. When he came back to Norway, he 
actively participated in the labor movement agitation.
12
In 1911 the Trade Union Opposition 
Group <Fagopposisjonen> was formed under Martin Tranmæl‘s leadership.
13
 The program of 
this group was to turn the trade union movement into the class struggle. The platform for the 
opposition was syndicalism which reached Norway through Sweden from the USA.
14
 
Perhaps, Tranmæl‘s major contribution to the evolvement of the labor movement in Norway 
was his journalistic work. From 1913 to 1918 he worked as an editor of the newspaper Ny Tid. 
For twenty-eight years (1921—1949) he occupied a position of the editor in the newspaper 
Social-Demokraten, which in 1923 was renamed Arbeiderbladet. Tranmæl‘s possessed 
extraordinary declamatory skills which made him ―the most effective orator among Nordic 
socialists.‖
15
 He had an ability to ―express and utilize the revolutionary sentiments with a 
speech that had its starting point in people‘s everyday life, was connected to the place and the 
situation and was open to various interpretations‖
16
. Martin Tranmæl was a member of the 
DNA‘s Central Committee from 1918 to 1963.  
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 Per Maurseth,  Fra Moskvateser til Kristiania-forslag: Det norske Arbeiderparti og Komintern fra 1921 til 
februar 1923 (Oslo: Pax, 1972), 34.  
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 Larssen, 33-34.  
12
 Store Norske Leksikon, s.v. ―Martin Tranmæl,‖ accessed April 29, 2014,  
http://snl.no/Martin_Tranm%C3%A6l  
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 Knut Langfeldt, Moskva-tesene i norsk politikk (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1961), 10-11. 
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 Per Maurseth,  Fra Moskvateser, 25. 
15
 Oddvar Høidal, Trotskij i Norge: et sår som aldri gror (Oslo: Spartacus, 2009), 52.  
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1.5. The development of the Norwegian labor press: a short description  
In order to ponder what place the Social-Demokraten occupied in the Norwegian press during 
1915—1923, it is useful to look at the way the labor press in Norway was evolving in the 
studied period. This topic has been scrutinized in the book Norwegian Press History
17
 where 
Norwegian scholars have studied the history of the Norwegian press and pointed out the 
peculiarities of its development. 
Newspapers began to play a central role in the activities of the Norwegian Labor movement 
shortly after 1860s when the working class started organizing itself in trade unions and 
established the DNA in 1887. Typographers were among the first groups in the labor 
movement who founded a strong and powerful trade union. In addition, the first editors within 
the DNA had a background in printing, as for instance, Christian Holtermann Knudsen who is 
referred to as the ―father of the Norwegian labor movement‖
18
. In the DNA-newspapers the 
connection with the Party was stronger than in the right-wing press. From the 1880s, when the 
press started being politicized and connected to the parties, the development of the Norwegian 
press took a new direction. It resulted in journalists‘ politicization. In 1887, when the DNA 
was established, the journalists joined the Norwegian Social Democratic Press Association 
(later Labor Party Press Association). The political press organizations included both editors 
and journalists, whose career was to a large extent linked to the party press, and it was almost 
impossible for a journalist to shift position between the labor and conservative press. Until the 
early twentieth century the labor newspapers prevailed over conservative newspapers. 




The heyday of the labor press took place from 1904 to 1917, the period when the greatest 
journalists started working in the field. In 1920 the organization Arbeiderpressens Samvirke 
was established for the purpose of ensuring the coordinated economic planning of all DNA-
newspapers. At that time the DNA-press consisted of 33 party newspapers: fifteen of them 
were daily papers, twelve was issued three days a week, and six newspapers came out twice a 
week.
20
 Nevertheless, the splits in the Party resulted in division of the labor press into two 
                                                 
17
 Rune Ottosen, Lars Arve Røssland, and Helge Østbye, Norsk Pressehistorie (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 
2002). 
18
 Olstad, 43. 
19
 Ottosen, Røssland and Østbye, 52-53, 59-60. 
20
 Parti, presse og publikum: 1880-1945, ed. Rune Ottosen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2010), 37. 
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groups. As a result of the Party split of 1921, the Social Democratic Labor Party of Norway 
was left with four newspapers. After the DNA‘s split of 1923, the left faction of the Party 
created the Norwegian Communist Party and took control over eleven newspapers (some of 
them were highly influential, for example Ny Tid). Hence, the DNA was left with twenty-five 
newspapers. Nevertheless, the Party tried to compensate the losses and established new papers 
– Bergen Social-Demokrat and Arbeider-Avisa.
21
  
Thus, the labor press in Norway was characterized by a strong connection between journalism 
and politics. In 1921 every third member of the parliamentary party group had a background 
in the press
22
. Hence, the studied period (1915—1923) could be referred to as the period of 
great politicization of the Norwegian labor press. 
1.6. The position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia 
In contrast to Denmark and Sweden, adherents of the radical course within the Labor Party in 
Norway won a majority already in 1918. The peculiarities of the DNA have been an issue that 
attracted researchers‘ interest. The question why the Norwegian labor movement was more 
radical than the labor movement in neighborly Denmark and Sweden has been discussed by a 
number of researchers. Three of them will be referred to in this paragraph, namely Edvard 
Bull sr., Jorunn Bjørgum and Einar A. Terjesen.  
According to Edvard Bull, the greater radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement was 
connected to three factors peculiar to Norway. Firstly, the industrialization and its 
consequences which took place after 1905 – when unskilled laborers employed in 
construction became the mainstay of the new revolutionary course within the Norwegian 
labor movement. Secondly, the democratization of the Norwegian political system 
characterized by parliamentarism and universal suffrage, gave the Norwegian social 
democrats the opportunity to act independently. In other words, unlike Sweden, the social 
democracy in Norway was not forced to maintain the alliance with the Liberal Party (Venstre) 
and therefore did not have to change its politics to make such an alliance possible. Thirdly, the 
topographic conditions, according to Bull, have determined the greater extent of 
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decentralization and democratic structure within the Norwegian labor movement than in 
Denmark and Sweden.
 23
   
Jorunn Bjørgum emphasizes that the dissolution between Norway and Sweden in 1905 is an 
important factor in the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement. The aftermath of the 




Einar A. Terjesen argues that in Denmark and Sweden the traditional conservative alliances 
among the army, nobility, high officials and upper-middle class were stronger than in Norway.  
It increased the resistance of central state authority to parliamentarism in Denmark and 
Sweden, and contributed to the longer democratization process in these two countries than in 
Norway. In both Denmark and Sweden there was a Parliament with two chambers with the 
purpose of conserving the upper-class‘ interests, while in Norway the parliamentarian system 
was based on one chamber, which also facilitated quicker democratization. The success of the 
radical wing within the DNA, Terjesen has linked to the greater ability of central leadership in 
the labor movements in Denmark and Sweden (before 1914) to determine the ideology and 
policies of the movements.
25
  
Moreover, one of the major events that illustrates the radicalization of the Norwegian labor 
movement is the DNA‘s affiliation to the Third International or the Comintern. The DNA 
underwent two splits in 1921 and 1923 respectively – both times the splits were inextricably 
connected with the Comintern.  
This thesis emphasizes the role of the Russian Revolution in the radicalization of the 
Norwegian labor movement. In the following chapter the research which has been done on the 
issue of the Russian Revolution‘s influence on the Norwegian labor movement will be 
discussed.  
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is comprised of six chapters. The first chapter involves the problem statement, the 
research questions, the authors‘ motivation and relevance for peace studies, the presentations 
                                                 
23
 Bjørgum, 29-30. 
24
 Ibid., 44. 
25
 Einar A. Terjesen, ―Demokrati og integrasjon. Sosialistiske og liberale partier 1890-1914,‖ Arbeiderhistorie 
(2005): 78-80.  
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of the three editors, and the position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia. The 
second chapter refers to the previous studies done on this topic and historical background of 
the situation in Norway in the studied period and the relations between the Bolsheviks and the 
Norwegian left. The third chapter explains the conceptual framework for the thesis, namely 
the self / other relations. The fourth chapter is devoted to the source criticism and 
methodology issues. The fifth chapter is the analysis divided into three parts in accordance 










Chapter 2. Previous studies and historical background 
 
2.1. Previous studies 
The topic of the influence of the Russian Revolution on the Norwegian labor movement has 
been addressed in the extensive research conducted predominantly by Norwegian authors. 
The framework of this thesis does not allow the author to mention all the researchers who one 
way or another have touched upon the connections between the Russian Revolution and the 
labor movement in Norway. However, few names should be mentioned in this regard – Per 
Maurseth, Åsmund Egge and Øyvind Bjørnson. Maurseth and Egge have examined the 
Comintern‘s influence on the developments within the DNA. Bjørnson has studied the history 
of the Norwegian labor movement in the period 1900—1920. Furthermore, three theses 
highly relevant for the actual analysis will be discussed in this paragraph. 
Per Maurseth is the author of both the third volume of the Arbeiderbevegelses historie i 
Norge
26
, a fundamental work on the history of the Norwegian labor movement, and the 
monograph Fra Moskva-teser til Kristiania-forslaget
27
. In the latter Maurseth scrupulously 
examines the mutual relations between the DNA, the trade union and youth movements on the 
one side and the Comintern on the other side. He traces the developments within these two 
entities which starts with the ―partial integration‖ and grows into ―acute mutual crisis‖.
28
 
Maurseth argues that the main issue in the conflict within the Party is concentrated on the 
Party‘s attitude towards the International.
29
 
Åsmund Egge has written a wide range of works
30
 on the links between the Comintern and 
the DNA. Here, the monograph Komintern og krisen i Det norske Arbeiderparti
31
 and the 
article Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen
32
 will be discussed. Egge focuses 
on the time span 1922—1923, which led to the second party split in November 1923. The 
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 Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935), (Oslo: Tiden, 1987). 
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 Åsmund Egge, ―Den russiske revolusjon i 1917 – et resultat av krigen?,‖ Nordisk Østforum 3 (1992), 32-43; 
Åsmund Egge, ―Aleksandra Kollontaj og norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1915-1930‖ in Revolusjon, kjærlighet, 
diplomati : Aleksandra Kollontaj og Norden, ed. Yngvild Sørbye (Oslo: Unipub, 2008), 55-82; Åsmund Egge 
and Sven G. Holtsmark, ―Soviet diplomacy and the Norwegian left, 1921-1939‖ in Caution & compliance: 
Norwegian-Russian diplomatic relations, 1814-2014, eds. Kari Aga Myklebost and Stian Bones (Stamsund: 
Orkana akademisk, 2012), 101-112. 
31
 Åsmund Egge, Komintern og krisen i Det norske Arbeiderparti, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995). 
32
 Åsmund Egge, ―Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen,‖ in Norge-Russland: naboer gjennom 
1000 år , ed. Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson, Jens PetterNielsen (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 
2004), 336-346.  
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historian argues that the discord between the Comintern and the DNA was the principal 
reason for the split in the Party.  Egge‘s study on the situation in the Party in 1922 is relevant 
for the paper as it to a greater extent represents the views of the Comintern on the 
developments within the labor movement in Norway. In other words, if Maurseth‘s analysis is 
directed at the representation of the situation from the DNA‘s standpoint, Egge‘s work 
demonstrates the situation presented through the Comintern‘s prism.     
In the article Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen, Egge provides insight into 
the relations between the Norwegian labor movement and the Soviet Union from 1917 to the 
early 1970s. Egge concludes that in Norway ―the Soviet Union had more significance for the 
labor movement than in Denmark or Sweden‖. And in the interwar period the Soviet Union 
was perceived in Norway as a positive example.
33
   
In 2006 Åsmund Egge and Russian historian Vadim Roginsky issued a collection of 
documents which has been preserved in the Comintern‘s archive in Moscow. The publication 
demonstrates the relations between the Comintern and the Norwegian labor movement during 
the DNA‘s membership in the Comintern (June 1919 to November 1923).
34
   
Øyvind Bjørnson is the author of the second volume in the series on the history of the 
Norwegian labor movement Arbeiderbevegelses historie i Norge.
35
 The last chapter of the 
volume Krigskonjunktur og oppbruddstendenser is particularly relevant for this thesis as it 
illustrates the situation in Europe with the focus on the revolutions in Russia and Germany 
and covers the Party Convention of 1918 when the radical wing obtained a majority.  
In addition, the issues addressed in this paper have been scrutinized in several theses written 
by Norwegian authors. For the sake of convenience, the Norwegian titles of these works will 
be translated into English by the author. The focus of this paragraph lies in the discussion of 
three works.  
The first work‘s substantial title is The Social-Demokraten and the Russian Revolution: a 
study of how the influence of the Russian Revolution on the split processes in the Norwegian 
labor movement manifested itself in the Social-Demokraten in the period from March 1917 to 
October 1920. The paper was written by Kai Arvid Køhler in 1969 and is highly relevant for 
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34
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the given analysis. As the title indicates Køhler‘s research question is close to the problem 
statement of this paper. Køhler focuses on two issues. The first issue is what events under the 
Russian Revolution were represented in the newspaper as controversial. The second question 
is what views on these controversial events existed in the Party. He examines the opinions of 
the Social-Demokraten‘s editors in the period 1917—1920: reformist Jacob Vidnes and radical 
Olav Scheflo on the situation in Russia under the February and October Revolutions. These 
editors represented different wings of the Party and consequently had diverse opinions on the 
Norwegian labor movement‘s development.
36
 Unlike Køhler‘s thesis, this paper analyzes the 
editorship of the three editors Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl and focuses 
not only on the Russian Revolution‘s influence on the split processes within the Party, but also 
covers the three editors‘ views on the methods used by the Bolsheviks and their aspiration to 
apply these methods in Norway. 
The second work, Between reformism and Bolshevism. The Norwegian labor movement, 
1918—1920: theory and practice, is a dissertation written in 1983 by Odd-Bjørn Fure. The 
dissertation meticulously covers the period 1918—1920 with emphasis on the ideological 
radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement, the implementation of the new radical 
course after 1918, and the opportunities for the revolutionary practice in Norway. The latter 
problem statement is relevant for this Master thesis. Fure argues that the situation in Norway 
was not as escalated as in Russia or Germany, and that those factors that led to direct actions 
by workers in Russia and Germany were not present in Norway in the period 1918—1920. In 
theory the ideas of a revolutionary development of the Norwegian labor movement were 
common, but they were not implemented in practice.
37
 In the given thesis the studied period 
covers nine years, 1915—1923, and refers to the radicalization of the labor movement 
through the prism of the newspaper Social-Demokraten, including the editorship of the 
reformist editor Jacob Vidnes. 
The third thesis A confirmed optimist: ―Social-Demokraten‖s foreign affairs‘ line in Olav 
Scheflo‘s editorship 1918—1921 was written in 1996 by Lars A. Døvle Larssen. The goals of 
Larssen‘s thesis are to describe how the foreign affairs are expressed in the newspaper and to 
explain how the Social-Demokraten‘s focus on certain foreign affairs is connected to Scheflo‘s 
personal political opinions. This paper is of interest for the given Master thesis as it contains a 
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chapter on the newspaper‘s attitude towards Soviet Russia and the Comintern.
38
 The author‘s 
focus is placed on Scheflo‘s perception of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet society as a 
role model for the international working class. Larssen points out that the ―solidarity with the 
Russian Revolution was one of the most notable features of the newspaper in this period‖
39
. 
Larssen argues that the greatest value of the Russian Revolution for Scheflo is that it set a 
start for a world revolution. Scheflo‘s main argument for the affiliation to the Comintern was 
the solidarity with the international revolution, not the solidarity with Soviet Russia.
40
 My 
thesis also argues that the entry to the Third International was determined by Scheflo‘s 
aspiration to accelerate the world revolution. Nevertheless, in the current analysis the 
solidarity with Soviet Russia will be particularly emphasized as a common thread running 
through Scheflo‘s editorship.  
2.2. Historical background  
The following paragraphs describe the situation in Norway and refer to the connections 
between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left under the studied period 1915—
1923. 
2.2.1. The situation in Norway 
Norwegian workers had considerable sympathy for the October Revolution in Russia. A hard 
economic situation during the war, when the cost of living increased approximately by 
140 %
41
, enhanced the revolutionary sentiments among workers in Norway.
42
 In the 
meantime, the Norwegian Labor Party became more radicalized. At the Party convention in 
1918, the radical wing, or ―the new direction‖ <den nye retning>, as it is called in Norwegian 
historiography, won a majority. Broadly speaking, the radical wing consisted of several 
groups: the group of the Trade Union Opposition Group of 1911 led by Martin Tranmæl, the 
Norwegian Social Democratic Youth League and The Social Democratic Student Association 
led by Olav Scheflo, Kyrre Grepp
43
 and Eugene Olaussen
44
. The radical wing of the Party to a 
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certain extent preserved the old reformist course. But there was no doubt that the ―new 
direction‖ implied a course shift. The key positions in the Party were occupied by the 
representatives of the radical wing: Martin Tranmæl became a party secretary, Kyrre Grepp 
became a chairman, Emil Stang
45
 – vice chairman, and Olav Scheflo was appointed the editor 
of the newspaper Social-Demokraten.
46
 The DNA‘s conventions of 1919 and 1920 indicated 
the radicalization of the Party regarding internal and international affairs. The mass actions 
were determined as a decisive means of the working class‘ struggle and the course to 
revolutionary communism was confirmed. The DNA withdrew from the Second 
International
47
 and affiliated to the Comintern.
48
 In summer 1920 the Comintern elaborated 
the Twenty-one Conditions for the membership in the organization. These conditions required 
from the party-members act in conformity with the Soviet guidelines. The Comintern‘s 
prerequisites were in contradiction to the views of the reformist wing. The latter principally 
disagreed with the Conditions. It led to the Party split in 1921 which resulted in the formation 
of the Social Democratic Party of Norway. The Comintern‘s policy of the centralization and 
growing pressure from Moscow provoked debates within the DNA on withdrawal from the 
Comintern. However, for the Comintern, the DNA‘s affiliation to the organization was 
important as the Party was one of the biggest sections in the Third International. The 
significance of this issue is also demonstrated by the fact that such prominent figures of the 
Comintern as Nicolay Bukharin
49
 and Karl Radek
50
 visited Norway in early 1923. 
Nonetheless, the DNA did not manage to avoid a new split. In November 1923 the Party 
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convention resolved to withdraw from the Comintern. The minority of the DNA created its 
own Norwegian Communist Party that remained the Comintern‘s section.
51
  
2.2.2. Connections between the Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left 
In this paragraph the connections between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left in 
the studied period will be briefly discussed.  
The radicalization of the DNA members manifested itself already during the Russian 
Revolution of 1905. The wider Norwegian population sympathized with Russian workers.
52
 In 
February 1905 the Social Democratic Youth League of Norway organized a collection of 
money in order to support the Russian Revolution.
53
 In Northern Norway, where the DNA 
was particularly popular, Russian revolutionaries received help.
54
 In the beginning of the 
twentieth century a group of Russian Marxist emigrants settled in the town Vardø, in the 
county of Finnmark. They were invited by the postmaster of the town and the representative 
of the Norwegian Parliament Adam Egede-Nissen. In 1906 the group established a publishing 
house Pomor. Until 1909, when the printing work was stopped, Vardø was a center of printing 
and smuggling of socialist, revolutionary literature to Russia. The smuggling of the literature 
continued till the outbreak of the First World War.
55
   
Despite the war, good neighborly relations between Norway and Russia were stable. From 
1914 to 1916 the value of the Norwegian exports to Russia increased by nine times. Since 
autumn 1918 the Entente powers
56
 exerted pressure on neutral Norway for the purpose of 
ending the country‘s relations with the Soviet government. As a result, since winter 1919 the 
official Norwegian connections with Russia were ceased.
57
 In January 1920 the international 
blockade was abolished and measures to resume trade relations between the countries were 
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When talking about the connections between the Russian and Norwegian labor movements, 
one should mention the representative of the Russian social democracy Aleksandra Kollontai. 
She came to Norway in 1915. At that time, her activity in Norway was linked to the anti-war 
propaganda and the youth socialist movement. She sought the Norwegian socialists‘ support 
of the Bolsheviks‘ opposition to the war. First of all, her influence on the radicalization of the 
Norwegian labor movement came through the personal connection with its leaders, including 
such prominent figures in the Youth League as Eugene Olaussen and Arvid Hansen. She 
presented Lenin‘s view on the war for them. Kollontai was trying to get her Norwegian 
friends (as she called them) on the track of Bolshevism.
59
 
Between 1917 and 1940 a lot of unofficial communication between the countries was kept 
through the labor movement. These links were fostered both through the Comintern, the 
solidarity with the October Revolution and the new Bolshevik state. Many Norwegian trade 
union delegations were a tool to enhance a sense of solidarity among Norwegian workers.
60
 
In the 1920s there was particularly intense collaboration between the DNA / later the 
Norwegian Communist Party and the Comintern. The latter delivered confidential information 
from the Norwegian Parliament Storting and the government apparatus to the Comintern. 
Moreover, the representatives of the Norwegian left contributed to the fulfillment of Soviet 
Russia‘s foreign policy goals. The representatives of the trade delegation reported to Moscow 
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Chapter 3. Conceptual framework 
This chapter is devoted to the conceptual framework for the thesis – the self / other 
perspective. The latter has been examined by scholars in diverse fields within both the 
humanities, political and social studies. The focus of this chapter lies in the self / other nexus 
discussed by Norwegian researcher Iver Neumann and exemplified by the research carried out 
by two authors – Bruno Naarden and Vladimir Kantor. In the monograph Uses of the Other: 
―The East‖ in European identity formation
62
, Neumann emphasizes how Russia affected 
Europe in the process of European collective identity formation. The approach Neumann 
presents in his book is useful for analyzing how the Russian Revolution was portrayed in the 
Norwegian labor movement. In the following paragraphs the introduction to the main 
concepts discussed by Neumann will be made. The self / other dichotomy will be illustrated 
by using the European socialists‘ perception of the Russian Other as an example. Finally, it 
will be reflected upon the image of Europe and its role in Russia‘s debate with the reference 
to the nineteenth century. 
There is a rich literature on the theme of identity formation, and Neumann is not the first 
scholar who has analyzed the self / other-subject. The author examines the role of Russia, or, 
in other words, how the Russian Other influenced the formation of European identity. 
Introducing the reader with the concept, Neumann delineates four ways of ―theorizing on the 
theme of the Other
63
, namely the ethnographic path, the psychological path, the Continental 
philosophical path, and the ‗Eastern excursion‘. All of the aforementioned ways of 
considering ‗otherness‘ have been scrutinized by the author with reference to such eminent 
scholars as Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Mikhail Bakhtin, Frederik Barth and others. 
Neumann refers to their research on the self / other relationship and concludes: ―...the 
formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and that a 
failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the 
formation of the self...‖
64
 Hence relying on Barth‘s reflections, Neumann asserts that ―the 
creation of social boundaries is not a consequence of integration but one of its necessary a 
priori ingredients‖. Therefore, researchers studying identity formation may be focused on 
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―how these boundaries come into existence and are maintained‖
65
.     
Using the self / other nexus in the analysis of the portrayals of the Russian Revolution in the 
labor movement in Norway contributes to a better understanding of how the Revolution 
facilitated the formation of the identity of the Norwegian left and more importantly might 
give insight into why the Norwegian Labor Party did choose another, more peaceful path. 
Neumann points out several guidelines for studying human collective identities. He writes 
that selecting only one type of а human collective (for instance, nations) would not provide a 
complete picture. Neumann states that collective identities are ―multifaceted and must be 
studied like that‖
66
. He exemplifies his statement with the self / other relationship of two 
states pointing out that ―those states are at the very same time involved in maintaining their 
collective identities vis-a-vis other types of human collectives – societies <...> or an 
organization of which they both are members‖
67
.  
Thus, in this analysis it is important to pay attention not only to the differences which 
naturally led to diverse conditions both in Norway and Russia, but also to the similarities as 
the fact that both the DNA and the Bolsheviks were members of the same influential 
organization Comintern. Another aspect when one studies self / other relations emphasized by 
Neumann is the researcher‘s awareness of what the analysis s/he carries out aims at – 
exclusion one from another or, conversely, inclusion; and how both of them arise. The thesis 
examines how self / other nexus manifested and reshaped itself in the editorials written by the 
tree editors.  
3.1. The Russian Other 
Neumann refers to the Russian Other when analyzing the role of the East in the European 
identity formation. Who is the Russian Other and what impact has it made on the collective 
European identity? 
The European image of the Russian Other has been projected throughout centuries. Looking 
at five centuries of Russian history (XVI—XX) and pondering how the perception of Russia 
affected the formation of European collective identity, Neumann concludes that Europeans 
have construed Russians as barbarians regardless of period of time and ruler; the barbarians 
                                                 
65
 Neumann, Uses of the Other, 35. 
66





that ought to be tamed if not by themselves then by Europeans. Neumann writes ―…Russia 
stands out for its five hundred-year history of always just having been tamed, civil, civilized; 
just having begun to participate in European politics; just having become part of Europe‖
68
. 
The very notion of Russian barbarity has had a tendency to impose a feeling of threat among 
Europeans which is tightly connected to the view on Russia as a learner. As Neumann points 
out, Russia is often represented as a ―learner of European economic and political practices‖
69
. 
If the idea of a learner is positively evolving and being supported by the Russian political 
course, then the feeling of threat gradually disappears. The other scenario, when the identity 
of learner changes into something else, accelerates the feeling of threat. 
In Europe the first reactions to the February Revolution were mainly positive compared to the 
reactions to the October Revolution. As it was put by the British, now Russia could surmount 
her backwardness and ―integrate into the world market‖
70
. With the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy
71
, the European world proclaimed the victory of capitalism. But shortly 
after, this perception was replaced by the version of ―how the Revolution devoured its own 
children‖
72
. As Neumann puts it, the Russian case was ‗special‘ as Russia being a 
―revolutionary power and thus a potential threat‖ was characterized by ―extraterritorial 
presence through the organized Communist movement‖
73
. The latter, commonly called the 
Comintern, exerted considerable influence on its party-members, including the DNA. The 
following chapters of the thesis will shed more light on this issue. 
In the course of Neumann‘s discussions, two issues have seemed relevant for this analysis, 
namely the perception of the October Revolution by European socialists and the idea of 
Russia as a part of Europe. 
3.2. The October Revolution in the eyes of European socialists 
In order to look at the self / other perspective in practice, the work Socialist Europe and 
Revolutionary Russia: perception and prejudice 1848—1923 may come in useful. It was 
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written by professor of Russian history Bruno Naarden. The author analyzes the European 
socialists‘ perceptions of Russia in the period between the Spring of Nations or the 
revolutions of 1848 and the formation of the USSR, or in other words, the period when the 
Russian revolutionary movement was established. Naarden pays particular attention to the 
images of Russia held by Europeans, but in contrast to Neumann, concentrates on European 
socialist movements and opinions of its supporters of revolutionary Russia. 
Naarden refers to three major wars fought by European states against another European state 
where Russia played a role of a crucial ally. He underlines the indispensability of Russia as an 
ally in suppressing the growth of and obtainment of dominance by one European state as it 
occurred in 1815, 1918 and 1945 with France and Germany during the Napoleonic, First and 
Second World wars respectively. But as soon as the threat was overcome and the balance was 
established, Russia was seen by its European allies as a significant danger that could upset the 
newly established stability. 
If the February Revolution was perceived by Europeans as a positive change for the further 
democratization in Russia, the October Revolution dispelled these hopes and changed the 
attitude to Russia considerably. The idea that the social structure in Europe could be 
undermined led to fierce and sometimes even hysterical reaction. The revolutionary 
sentiments in Russia were seen as a virus, as a severe contagious disease like the plague. And 
those who in every possible way opposed those ideas attempted to distribute what Naarden 
calls a ―preventive medicine‖
74
.  
After the armistice with Germany in November 1918, the reflections on the Soviet regime 
sounded increasingly militant. The European press and, not surprisingly, mainly the German 
right-wing press gave highly negative assessment of Bolshevism, branding it as ―the greatest 
danger of the civilized world‖, ―systematic murder and robbery‖, ―barbarism‖, the ―absolute 
rule of delinquency‖ etc. Conversely, German socialists attempted to abstain from severe 
critique of the Bolsheviks, but at the same time their attitudes could not be seen as an 
endorsement of Bolshevism.
75
 Besides, the Western press did not predict the long existence of 
the Communist regime in Russia. Naarden provides the reader with an interesting 
observation: in the course of two years between November 1917 and November 1919 the 
New York Times mentioned and predicted the rapid fall of the regime in Russia ninety-one 
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 Ironically, the European left-wing in general did not support the Bolsheviks to the 
extent it may have been expected, although some of them ―tried to show some understanding 




3.3. Europe in the eyes of Russians 
Another perception studied by Iver Neumann is the role of Europe in the formation of Russian 
identity. The analysis of the interaction between Europe and Russia has been presented by 
Neumann in the monograph Russia and the Idea of Europe: a study in identity and 
international relations. The author scrutinizes several periods in Russian history, starting with 
the eighteenth and finishing with the late twentieth century. Neumann points out that at the 
heart of the book lies the demonstration of ―how Russians, when they set out to discuss 
Europe, also discuss themselves‖
78
. The emphasis of this paragraph is put on the time from 
post- First World War period to the formation of the Soviet Union. In other words, it covers 
the period relevant for this analysis, namely 1915—1923. Describing the internal Russian 
debate on Europe between 1915 and 1923 allows the author to create a broader picture of the 
relations between a self and other, and better understand how these constructs interact.  
Neumann distinguishes two main ideas in the Russian debate on Europe from the period after 
the October Revolution until the beginning of the 1920s – Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik 
views. According to Neumann, the Bolsheviks dealt primarily with the dichotomy ―true 
Europe‖ and ―false Europe‖, where the former represented the ―European working movement, 
including the Russian one‖, while the latter signified capitalist Europe, ―tsarist technical 
personnel, Russian middle peasants, German petit bourgeois, Polish officers and so on‖
79
. 
Within the Bolshevik perception the author delineates two major focuses regarding ―false 
Europe‖. One of them is whether the Bolshevik proletarian state should align with the above 
mentioned ―false Europe‖. The other is what scale the class war between the proletarian state 
or progressive Europe and stagnant Europe should be followed. Accordingly, these two 
questions were underlined in the internal Russian debate on Europe and were presented by 
two views. On the one hand, there was emphasized the elimination of the inner enemy or 
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rather ―the remnants of stagnant Europe‖ within the state, and only afterwards the accord with 
the rest of ―true Europe‖. This standpoint was basically supported by Vladimir Lenin. On the 
other hand, there was an opinion held by Nikolai Bukharin, a prominent Bolshevik and 
Marxist who later, in 1926, would take the position of chairman of the Comintern‘s Executive 
Committee. He remarked upon the issue more resolutely asserting that the alignment with 
―false Europe‖ would be harmful for Russia. The only way of interaction with stagnant 
Europe is a struggle against militarism and imperialism.
80
 Thus, this short description of the 
debate on Europe among the Bolsheviks illustrates the discourse, the categories that the 
Bolsheviks embraced. 
The second view on Europe was non-Bolshevik or what Neumann calls the Romantic 
nationalist position. The Romantic nationalists had been epitomized by two ideological and 
political movements – smenovekhovtsy and the Eurasianists. Briefly, both of them consisted 
of a group of Russian emigrants – the intellectuals who had left Russia as a result of the 
October Revolution and who broadly speaking contemplated Russia‘s fate and possible ways 
of her development. In other words, two coteries expressed their attitude towards Russia and 
its relationships with Europe. The name smenovekhovtsy derived from the publication called 
Smena vekh for which the members of the group (to mention the most prominent one, Nikolay 
Ustryalov) wrote articles. Ustryalov considered the size and therefore the ability to expand 
territorially as an important element for the well-being of the state. Imperialism, according to 
Ustryalov, ought to be a starting point in the Russian foreign policy.  
As far as the second coterie is concerned, the name of Nikolay Trubetskoy should be 
mentioned. He argued that Russia ought to ally herself with Asia in a struggle against Europe 
illustrated as ―the product of the history of a specific ethnic group‖
81
. Trubetskoy referred to 
Europeans as Romano-Germans who considered themselves representatives of humanity and 
from whom Russia had to abstain.  
Thus, both perceptions described above depict controversy, at times hostile confrontation, 
towards Europe. Both groups consisted of persons who were for one reason or another forced 
to leave their homeland, not least leave for Europe, which makes the whole discussion more 
precious and illustrative regarding ‗othering‘ Europeans.   
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3.4. A Russian European 
The perception of Europeans by Russians has played an important role in the understanding of 
the Russian self-identity. The self / other nexus has been a matter of considerable debate 
between Slavophiles and Westernizers
82
. Although the debate mainly took place in the 
nineteenth century, the relations between Europe and Russia have been considered through the 
prism of that particular discussion later on. Neumann has not put much accent on it. 
Accordingly, it is worth mentioning Vladimir Kantor, a contemporary Russian writer, 
philosopher, and lecturer, and his article A Russian European as a task for Russia
83
. In the 
article the author reflects upon the debate on Europe among Russian intellectuals and upon a 
phenomenon called a Russian European. 
Kantor finds a row of similarities between the Slavophiles and Westernizers despite that 
traditionally they have been set against one another. To reiterate, the debate took place 
primarily in the nineteenth century, but have been extrapolated to the twentieth century, the 
time when the Bolsheviks seized power. Interestingly, Kantor considers the October 
Revolution to be a result of the fusion of Slavophiles‘ and Westernizers‘ ideas. According to 
Kantor, Vladimir Lenin absorbed both Westernizers‘ views, such as hatred for the Russian 
Orthodox Church and for the so-called Oblomovism (oblomovshchina)
84
, as well as 
Slavophiles‘ beliefs, that manifested themselves through the transfer of the capital from Saint 
Petersburg to Moscow and the proclamation of bourgeois West to be Russia‘s enemy.
85
 
The thought that Russia is something opposite to Europe became to a certain extent the 
starting point of the debate. Both Slavophiles and Westernizers were fearful of real threats and 
troubles that Europe was faced with. The European path seemed problematic for them. 
Therefore, they moved from the idealization of Europe to the idealization of themselves as 
holders, and more importantly performers, of the superior ideas created in the West, namely 
socialism and other forms of revolutionism.
86
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Like Neumann, Kantor accentuates the romanticism of the beliefs shared by both Slavophiles 
and Westernizers. He contrasts them with a realistic look at Russia‘s and the West‘s fate held 
by Russian Europeans. The Russian Europeans are a cultural phenomenon. It is significant to 
realize that the discourse in the Russian debate on Europe was not painted in black and white 
colors as it is often presented, but depicted in various tones. The phenomenon that Kantor 
calls the Russian European represents the special attitude to and perception of Europe. 
According to Kantor, the Russian European is a person who realized that Europe had 
undergone disasters and catastrophes, such as wars, epidemics, and revolts. The Russian 
European understood that Europe still had not erased social contradictions. However, her 
greatest merit is that each time Europe attempts to solve them without putting the blindfold on 
her eyes.
87
 Russian Europeans expected this attitude from the Russian people as well, instead 
of applying the ready European solutions for Russian problems. Hence, Kantor makes 
parallels with Bolshevism and writes ―when cursing the West and denying the principle of 
individuality we try to adapt at least one of European ideas, it loses immediately its European 
essence. This is the phenomenon of Leninist-Stalinist Marxism which pulled Russia into the 




The self / other perspective provides a conceptual framework that looks into the relationships 
between Europe and Russia through the prism of debate and perceptions experienced by both 
sides. The understanding of Russian and European ‗otherness‘ is an important aspect in 
studying the connections between Russian revolutionary events and the sentiments in the 
Norwegian left, represented by the DNA. Furthermore, the DNA perceived itself as the Party 
belonging to the West-European cultural sphere as well as the British political tradition. The 
Russian Bolsheviks, in contrast, culturally was placed between the East and the West and 
relied upon Marxist theories. 
All in all, the way how both Europeans and Russians perceived each other in the studied 
period has been discerned. It has been underlined how meaningful those perceptions were for 
their self-definition. As far as Europe is concerned, the twentieth century along with the 
revolution of 1917, encouraged even left Europeans to abstain from the radical ideas which 
had been sowed in the Russian soil, though rooted in Europe, and reaped primarily by 







Russians. The repercussions of the October Revolution frightened Europeans and perhaps 
raised awareness of how different they were from Russians. As for Russians, the debate on 
Europe played a significant, if not an essential role in their identity formation. Although, the 
debaters took diverse positions, the fusion of their ideas among other things resulted in the 
October Revolution. Not least, the Russian discussion of Europe gave birth to a special 







Chapter 4. Sources and Methodology 
The importance of newspapers as a primary historical source has not attracted as much 
researchers‘ interest as their social significance. Needless to say, considerable research has 
been done on the press and its influence on the formation of public opinion, on its language 
etc. In this chapter the following issues with emphasis on the newspaper Social-Demokraten 
will be discussed: the press as a category of historical sources, the ways of reading 
newspapers as historical sources, and the selection of the editorials for the thesis.   
4.1. The press’ place among historical sources 
Source studies are a discipline which focuses on the use of sources and their criticism. 
Historical sources are often divided in various groups dependent on their types. This 
discussion will focus on written, first hand historical sources, namely the press. 
Soviet and later Russian researchers of source studies have paid considerable attention to the 
press as a source of historical data. The classification of written historical sources has been a 
significant issue in Soviet / Russian historiography. Already in the 1950s the printed media 
was distinguished as an independent historical source along with legislative acts, 
documentation and record keeping, personal narratives, publicist writings, literary works, and 
scientific works.
89
 Each of the aforementioned types in is turn divided into subgroups. As far 
as the press is concerned, it may be presented in different forms – newspapers, magazines, 
bulletins, etc.; and include diverse genres – informative, analytical, and art-publicistic
90
.  
The informative genre in the newspaper Social-Demokraten includes accounts (a detailed 
description of an event with a minimal subjective evaluation), items (a statement of facts), 
reports (information from place where events occur, author‘s attitude is clearly expressed). 
The analytical genre is represented by articles (where emphasis is put on author‘s opinion on 
an issue), particularly by editorials, where the editor gives their opinion on an issue; and 
finally the art-publicist genre refers to causeries and feuilletons
91
. The thesis focuses on the 
information represented by an analytical genre as the latter accentuates attitudes of the 
newspaper towards the studied issues.  
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However, in recent years the use of the press as a historical source has been revised. The 
question whether the press should be referred to as a distinct category of historical sources has 
been analyzed by Vadim Rynkov
92
. The Russian historian argues that the press cannot be 
considered as an independent historical source as the press is not a comprehensive source 
itself, but includes a variety of sources. So for example, a newspaper may contain both 
legislative acts, and literary works; consequently, the researcher suggests regarding each piece 
of writing published in the press as a source, instead of regarding a whole publication as a 
source. 
In this thesis the press is referred to as a separate category of historical sources, while 
newspapers are seen as one of the forms of the press. The focus of this study is the whole 
newspaper Social-Demokraten which is considered as a historical source, as well as all the 
relevant content of the newspaper represented by the analytical genre. 
One of the arguments for the use of the press as a source of historical data is its crucial role in 
both reflecting and shaping a society. They contain not only bare facts of what actually 




Thus, newspapers become more than a secondary source when one seeks to comprehend the 
public opinion or an opinion of a group of people.
94
 They transcend the atmosphere of time 
and contain descriptions of prominent economic, social and cultural developments in the 
society.
95
 They are a mouthpiece of political trends in a society which express not only 
political events, but also public reactions to them. Hence, the newspaper as a source is useful 
for studying how opinions are created and what affects those opinions. 
Editorials are one of the principal components when reading newspapers as historical sources. 
Since the amount of the source material is quite substantial, the author decided to pay special 
attention to the editorials, as they express an attitude of newspapers‘ editors and as a rule are 
devoted to important domestic and foreign issues. Editorials are often considered to be 
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representative not only of the editor‘s views, but also of the newspaper‘s views.
96
 They are 
perceived as a voice of the newspaper‘s political and ideological position. The editor has 
responsibility for the political content particularly in editorials. Therefore, editorials are 
regarded as more thorough than the rest of the newspaper‘s material.
97
 Furthermore, reading 
editorials may contribute to detecting the continuity in the newspaper‘s opinions.
98
 Thus, 
editorials may be considered as a mouthpiece for an official opinion of the newspaper, which 
is a major factor in understanding attitudes towards Russia / Soviet Union.    
The newspaper Social-Demokraten is available on microfilms in the library of University of 
Tromsø. The period of 1915—1923 is represented on thirty-three microfilms. The quality of 
the materials was primarily good apart from several issues which were blurry or unreadable, 
dark or, conversely, bright. However, the microfilm scanner program ScanPro 2000 facilitated 
the easier reading of the materials providing the reader with a bar of different tools helping to 
adjust the articles for better use. The articles could be copied as PDF-files on the computer, a 
memory stick, or printed out.  
4.2. Ways of using newspapers as historical sources 
There are several ways of using newspapers as sources of historical data. The topic has been 
described by the Norwegian historian Hallvard Tjelmeland in the article Newspapers as a 
historical source
99
.   
The first way is to look at newspapers simply as a source of relevant information. In other 
words, to discover a piece of information that could be found only in this particular 
newspaper and that contains first- or second-hand observations on wide range of topics
100
. 
This approach could be represented by various news items, in other words, statements of 
facts. The newspaper is filled by this type of news. An example of it may be a short piece of 
news on an agreement on export of wheat from Russia to France dated January 4, 1915.  
Secondly, newspapers may be seen as a ―remnant‖. It means that a historian pays attention not 
only to the direct message (as for instance, an agreement on wheat export), but also to the way 
and reason why they are presented this way, in other words, the author‘s intention. In this 
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case, it is more important to possess detailed knowledge of the newspaper the piece of 
information is taken from. Considering newspapers as a source for researching certain views 
and attitudes entails two aspects. The first aspect is that a historian may look at opinions 
expressed in the newspaper and regard it as an actor in the political race. The second aspect is 
more indirect and emphasizes how the newspaper through its statements reflects opinions 
present in the society. Hence, using newspapers as an expression of opinions and attitudes 
falls under the category of ―remnants‖.
101
 The thesis emphasizes both aspects. The focus is 
placed on the newspaper‘s opinion on the Russian Revolution represented by the three editors‘ 
views. This way signifies reading the Social-Demokraten as an opinion-maker.  
Thirdly, newspapers could be examined as reality-makers. Newspapers do not only passively 
reflect modernity, they also create reality. In other words, newspapers may be a source of how 
the reality is being constructed. And newspapers have an ability to create unity among its 
readers.
102
 For instance, it may be expressed as unity within an ethnicity, within a region, or 
the unity between classes as it occurred in case of the Social-Demokraten. The newspaper 
became a mouthpiece for Norwegian workers and was supported by them. Finally, the fourth 
way is to study newspapers as a media product, not only as a relevant category of sources.
103
 
Hence, considering the newspaper through the prism of this approach will allow the 
researcher to find the place of the Social-Demokraten among other Norwegian newspapers 
under the studied period. 
Thus, four ways of approaching newspapers as historical sources have been described. All of 
them are relevant for studying the Social-Demokraten as the focus of the paper lies in all the 
categories described by H. Tjelmeland. Firstly, the emphasis is placed on facts about the 
Russian Revolution, events that took place in Russia / Soviet Union and how they influenced 
the Norwegian left wing. Secondly, opinions, attitudes and evaluations of these events and 
their consequences are crucial for the research. Thirdly, detecting the way the author tried to 
influence the readers is important, and finally, the newspaper as a representative of the 
Norwegian labor press should be understood.  
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4.3. Selection of sources for the thesis 
The editorials of the newspaper Social-Demokraten have been selected in accordance with 
their relevance to the topic. The articles were considered relevant dependent on their content. 
The editorials devoted to Russia / Soviet Union politically, socially, economically and 
culturally have been taken into consideration. Such a wide range of criteria for the selection of 
relevant materials provides a broad spectrum of attitudes towards Russia / the Soviet 
government and allows the researcher to get a more accurate picture of the influences coming 
from there. 
Special attention has been paid to the editorials as they are an important source when one 
attempts to understand the ―official‖ position of a newspaper. Editorials frequently represent 
the editor‘s point of view, which makes them a specifically valuable source when studying the 
newspaper‘s political affiliations. During nine years, from 1915 to 1923, the newspaper 
Social-Demokraten had three editors, namely Jacob Vidnes (1912—1918), Olav Scheflo 
(1918—1921) and Martin Tranmæl (1921—1949)
104
. Reading the editorials produced by the 
three editors might give knowledge not only of the editorial staff and their journalistic 
capacities, but more importantly also of a possible divergence of opinions on the Russian 
Revolution and its consequences. 
In general 125 editorials have been collected. The author has divided them into eight groups 
in accordance with their topics. Although such a division of sources is rather tentative, it is 
still a useful tool to describe tendencies and patterns in the collected material. Thus, the eight 
categories include topics on Russian / Soviet foreign affairs; Russian / Soviet domestic affairs; 
connections between Norway and Russia; the situation of workers in European countries and 
labor movement in general; the activity of the DNA; the International; socialism, class 
struggle, social democracy; and other issues that have not fit any of the aforementioned 
categories. Hence, it helps provide a way to ascertain which categories prevail and therefore 
connect it to certain events, to the editor and his personal attitudes to these events; and as a 
result discover the change in newspaper‘s ―official‖ opinion, if it took place.  
4.4. Summary 
Using newspapers as historical sources implies applying a certain method for reading them. It 
is important to clearly define what one is seeking to find: bare facts, opinions / attitudes, or 
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perhaps both. In this respect, the four ways discussed by Tjelmeland are useful. Besides, 
newspapers may include many types of information, which makes them a richer source. 
Accordingly, when using the press as a historical source we may risk collecting insufficient, 
rather than false data.
105
 
Newspapers as a phenomenon are exposed to bias, censorship, and inaccuracies. 
Nevertheless, the type of bias likely to occur in the press is more of ―silence and emphasis 
rather than outright false information‖
106
. In the thesis the political bias expressed in the 
Social-Demokraten is a salient part of the analysis. The bias may affect newspaper‘s main 
target audience by portraying certain events in a certain way. Moreover, the political bias in 
the Social-Demokraten‘s editorials is the indicator of political will and ideological intentions 
of the editors. 
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Chapter 5. Analysis 
5.1. The editorship of Jacob Vidnes   
This analysis is based on twenty-eight (28) editorials written by Jacob Vidnes in the period 
from 1915 to 1918. The editorials cover a wide range of topics. The following paragraphs are 
organized thematically. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate Vidnes‘ views on: the 
position of the working class and the day of the 1
st
 of May, the issues of peace and 
disarmament, revolutionary Russia, and finally, the attitude to radicalism. 
5.1.1. The 1
st
 of May and the working class 
In 1907 the Second International held a Congress in Stuttgart. It was declared that the social 
democratic parties must make a great effort to prevent the war. Norway was a member of the 
Congress. However, those attempts did not succeed – the First World War became a factum.
107
 
In the editorials Jacob Vidnes refers to the issue of workers‘ condition in connection with the 
First World War. The editor is consistent in evaluating the war – he considers it as an obstacle 
to the further development of the international labor movement. In the article titled 1915
108
, 
Vidnes underlines the significance of strong labor unions as a counterbalance to the forces 
seeking to suppress the working class and exacerbate its living conditions. These forces are 
epitomized by the upper class who takes advantage of the current circumstances at the cost of 
the working class. Vidnes‘ statements somewhat correlate with the course that had been taken 
at the Second International‘s Congress in Stuttgart. The parties came to an agreement to 
utilize the economic and political crisis initiated by the war in order to raise broad layers of 
population and thereby accelerate a fall of capitalism.
109
 
In addition, the editor emphasizes the importance of the working class in the international 
arena with the focus on the day of the First of May and its meaning for workers. This day was 
primarily an agitation day, when the labor movement came out into the streets to deliver its 
political message. Furthermore, it was a day when the labor movement could demonstrate its 
evolvement and growth.
110
 This topic has been discussed by Vidnes in the article This year‘s 
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 of May, in his opinion, is particularly important in this 
regard. It is the day when workers should gather, support the International and the class 
struggle against ‗capitalist exploiters‘. According to Vidnes, the class struggle and socialism 
are the ground on which the working class should reconstruct the international fraternity 
undermined by the war. The author emphasizes the necessity to revise the International. For 
him the latter plays a crucial role not only for the working class, but also for the future and 
restoration of European culture
112
. However, the editor sees the war as a catalyst for the 
spread of hate among nations. Therefore, he suggests developing a new international 
understanding with the help of the International. Perhaps, by the ―new international 
understanding‖ Vidnes meant the new Zimmerwald-movement, which was established in 
1915 in the eponymous town in Switzerland. The movement sought to strengthen the 
internationalist socialist movement after the war. In August 1918 Italian socialists initiated the 
conference in Swiss Zimmerwald with thirty-eight delegates from eleven countries. The left-
wing of the conference proposed a principle according to which the socialists‘ task was to lead 








, Vidnes asserts that socialist 
consciousness now has been awoken in all countries. He underlines the importance of the 
demand for peace among workers, and the struggle against militarism and capitalism.   




 to the demand for an 
eight-hour working day. He writes that this issue has been major among workers all over the 
world, not least in revolutionary Russia. He considers this demand to be a means of pushing 
forward workers‘ needs and of seizing political and economic power in the society. Hence, to 
some extent he reiterates his opinion that on the 1
st
 of May workers should demonstrate more 
actively against scarcity and arms policy. 
The author also specifies which slogans workers should demonstrate with. They are struggle 
against military fraud and bread overpricing as well as the working class‘ liberation from 
capitalism and militarism. Summing up the results of the year 1915, Vidnes in the eponymous 
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 draws attention to the workers‘ situation. As he points out, the position of the 
working class has not been improved compared to other social groups who have enriched 
themselves during the year. He hopes that in the next year 1916 workers will gather in order 
to liberate the society from dismays, overthrow capitalism and ―move forward to a new light 
socialist day‖
117
.   
Thus, the editorials on the working class and its position in the society have been one of the 
central themes in the period of Vidnes‘ editorship. Reflecting upon this issue, he refers to 
Russia and the Russian Revolution only once, in regard to the demand for an eight-hour 
working day. However, Vidnes‘ rhetoric is sympathetic towards the rhetoric of revolutionary 
workers in Russia, and is indicative of his deep-seated left-wing views. 
5.1.2. Peace and disarmament as guidelines for a socialist policy  
Most of the selected editorials written by Vidnes are connected to the subject of socialism and 
social democracy. For Vidnes it seems to be a matter of honor to defend the peaceful views of 
the Party from the insults hurled by the right-wing press. Vidnes calls the latter the 
―conservative military organs‖ and accuses it of cynicism. He often contrasts the Social-
Demokraten with the right-wing press underlining the importance of peace particularly for the 
newspaper Social-Demokraten. For example, he emphasizes that unlike the party Venstre the 
social democrats demand social solidarity and seek to create economy where ―no one feels 
aggrieved, where no one enriches themselves at the expense of other people‘s work and where 
no one who is willing to work feels lack of anything‖
118
. In general, Vidnes considers social 
democracy as the best and the only means of peace. But the editor admits that international 
socialism has been too weak to prevent the First World War.
119
 Six months later in July 1915 
he writes that international social democracy had quickly responded to the war but was not 
able to spread its influence among the masses. 
The criticism of the Norwegian right-wing press has been also expressed in relation to the 
support of arms policy. The author analyzes the role of armament in Norway‘s politics in the 
article Future of the Country
120
. He emphasizes the significance of peace and disarmament for 
social democrats stating that they are one of few coteries who advocate peace. However, a 
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year later, in 1916
121
, he slightly changes his argument stating that all political forces in 
Norway are interested in peace. Naturally, he discerns the leading role of the working class in 
this process, and appeals to the latter to be vigilant and capable of using the power and 
influence they possess to maintain the national and economic interests of the country and its 
people. 
The topic of peace and disarmament constantly runs through Vidnes‘ editorials. For instance, 
he exemplifies the possible harm of armament by reflecting upon the dissolution of the union 
between Sweden and Norway in 1905. The editor concludes that if Norway possessed larger 
arsenal in 1905, the nation would have been involved in the war rather than reached the 
Karlstad agreement with Sweden. Vidnes believes that the arms policy contributes to an 
outbreak of war and leads to suppression of an independent state. He sets Russia as an 
example, where social democrats did not support the adoption of the state grant on war 
expenses. Reflecting upon this, Vidnes writes that this action ―has shown that the spirit and 
existence of international socialism has not faded away, it is still in the world proletariat‘s 
heart‖
122
. Vidnes highly praises Russian social democracy which, in spite of the upper class‘ 
enthusiasm for war and national chauvinism did what it was entitled to do, namely resisted the 
country‘s military build-up. 
As early as 1915 Vidnes predicts the failure of tsarism. Being an ardent supporter of the 
termination of the war, Vidnes condemns the tsar for popularizing the war and states that 
―tsarism and its henchmen are and will be the same, they have learned nothing and they have 
forgotten nothing. Therefore they will facilitate their own dissolution.‖
123
 
Thus, the issues of peace and disarmament have been represented by Jacob Vidnes as crucial 
for international socialism in general and for the DNA in particular. The editor rigorously 
responses to the critique from the conservative press, asserting in most of the editorials that 
the working class is one of the few social groups who is willing to reach peace. As for 
revolutionary Russia, the author in the article Social Democracy and Peace dated 1917 
positively evaluates her demands for a peace treaty and asserts that she has also raised a hope 
for peace in other countries at war.
124
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5.1.3. Revolutionary Russia  
There is a series of editorials concerning revolutionary Russia. They are quite inconsistent 
regarding the assessments of events taking place in Russia as well as to the Bolshevik rule. 
On the one hand, the editor seems receptive to Bolsheviks politics, but on the other hand he 
may sharply criticize their actions. 
Vidnes underlines the significance and indispensability of Russia as a member of the so-called 
socialist world in the editorial about the Stockholm conference
125
. The initiative for an 
international socialist conference belonged to neutral Dutch and Scandinavian socialists with 
the official name the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee established in May 1917. The latter 
aimed at ―bringing the parties of the belligerent countries together to see if common ground 
could be reached on a general socialist peace policy‖.
126
 The conference was postponed and 
later cancelled due to the Entente governments‘ refusal to give out the necessary documents 
for the socialists who were going to the conference. Revolutionary Russia telegraphed that the 
representatives from Russia would be sent on the condition that the other international 
participants would be members of socialist parties. Emphasizing the role of Russia in the 
coming conference, the editor writes that ―the international conference without affiliation of 
revolutionary socialist Russia definitely cannot be held‖
127
. This demonstrates Vidnes‘ 
perception of Russia‘s role in international social democracy. 
In general, the attitude of Vidnes to the revolution in Russia appears to be positive. In the 
article Reaction and Revolution
128
 dated 1917, the editor sharply criticizes the conservative 
French and English press for the support of militarism. The French newspaper Martin and the 
English Times have asserted that they hope that General Kornilov
129
 will be able to stop the 
revolution in Russia. Vidnes calls such a statement a betrayal. He considers ‗saving‘ the 
Russian Revolution to be the biggest task for the world democracy. If the revolutionary 
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At the same time, Vidnes is very cautious in his evaluations of the Bolshevik‘s politics in 
Russia. In the editorial with the indicative title Revolution‘s Chaos
131
 Vidnes on the one hand 
overtly denounces Kerensky‘s
132
 policy as incapable of solving current problems in Russia. 
But on the other hand, he admits that Russia is not mature enough for socialism – few people 
in the country know what socialism is, not to mention Bolsheviks‘ maximalist socialist 
theories, the editor writes.
133
 Vidnes associates the considerable support of the Bolsheviks 
among the population with their demand for making peace with Germany. Hence, for Vidnes 
the peace issue appears to be a key element in the Bolshevik politics as only peace can save 
the revolution.  
Despite the editor‘s enthusiasm for Russia‘s initiative to end the war, he is not as enthusiastic 
about the idea of a Russian separate peace with Germany. He presumes that the separate peace 
should be avoided by the Russian Bolshevik leaders represented by Vladimir Lenin and Lev 
Trotsky as it will be not only humiliating for Russia, but also contradicting the principles of 
peace which have been set by revolutionary Russia.
134
  
The February Revolution has been discussed by Vidnes briefly. In March 1917, the editor 
issues an article under the title The Revolution
135
, where he draws parallels between the 
French, German
136
  and Russian revolutions and concludes that the latter ―looks more like a 
coup in a left direction rather than a revolution with a complete change of social and political 
systems as a goal‖. He refers to the interview of Foreign Minister of the Provisional 
Government in Russia Pavel Milukov in Social-Demokraten in September 1916
137
. As Vidnes 
puts it, according to this interview, liberal and ‗working Russia‘
138
 wish the dream about the 
Dardanelles to be fulfilled. In other words, Russian imperialist ambitions to take control of the 
strategically important strait towards the Black Sea named Dardanelles were still of current 
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interest. Vidnes sees in such a statement the official position of revolutionary Russia which is 
disappointing for the editor. Nevertheless, Vidnes realizes that a real democratic rule of people 
is vastly different from the traditional tsar rule that the Russian people are so used to. 
Therefore, according to the editor, the appeal to democracy can fairly be called the Great 
Russian Revolution although there is still much to be done. 
Over the years Vidnes‘ critical judgments on the Bolshevik policies become more definite. 
This tendency manifests itself mainly in the editorials written in 1918. Perhaps, the most 
radical critique of the Bolshevik government is expressed in the editorial Gross Violations
139
. 
The violations are connected with the political course taken by the Bolshevik government. 
This course is described by Vidnes as Bolsheviks‘ brutal suppression of democracy, 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly
140
, arrests of the social democratic party leadership, 
suppression of the press, persecution of dissidents. These aspects of Bolsheviks‘ politics cause 
Vidnes‘ indignation expressed in a statement that Bolshevism undoubtedly is not going to be 
better than tsarism. It is a serious assertion taking into consideration the moderate support of 
Bolshevism having been lent by Vidnes previously. Interestingly, in the editorial under the 
title Bolshevik Government
141
 which was issued only four days before, Vidnes is more tolerant 
of the Bolshevik rule. He does not accept the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. For 
Vidnes it was the only authority that gained trust and that could evoke necessary respect for 
the republic among the population.
142
 He assumes that this step will not contribute to 
strengthening the power of socialism and peace in Russia. Furthermore, he believes that the 
possibilities of freedom, democracy, socialism and peace are considerably reduced in Russia. 
But in spite of Vidnes‘ discontent with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, he is still 
receptive to this action. On the one hand, citing German General Hoffman, he does not deny 
that the Bolsheviks carry out military dictatorship. But on the other hand, he justifies it by 
speculating on what Trotsky could have replied to General Hoffman. The answer could have 
been that the military dictatorship is a temporary necessity present until people themselves 
would express their opinions.  
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In addition, the editor criticizes
143
 the newspaper Morgenbladet, which has stated that Russia 
and the revolution there pose a threat to Norway. Vidnes writes that the conservative press 
seeks not to miss the opportunity to be fearful of Russia <russerfrygt> because it justifies 
their will to get more militarized. Thus, Vidnes‘ assessments regarding revolutionary Russia 
are not consistent. On the one hand, he favors the revolutionary changes in Russia brought 
about by the Bolsheviks, as they have been contributing to the democratization of the Russian 
society. But on the other hand, he condemns the Bolsheviks‘ dictatorial ambitions. 
5.1.4. Radicalism 
As it has been demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, Vidnes steadily emphasizes the need 
for peaceful resolutions of the disputes between countries at war. He repeatedly underlines the 
importance of law and justice and the significance of respecting the will of people. In this 
regard, Vidnes considers monarchy as an obstacle and it becomes obvious how the aversion of 
constitutional monarchy in Vidnes‘ editorials comes to the fore. For example, in the article 
The Revision of the Constitution or Revolution
144
, the author sees the roots of the war not in 
the disagreement among the state-participants, but in the fulfillment of the thirst for power 
among monarchs and the high command. Hence, the termination of the war Vidnes directly 
links to the abolishment of few people‘s rule in states and social structures. Such a statement 
apparently hints at the use of revolutionary methods.   
As it has been mentioned above, the issues on peace and disarmament are central for Jacob 
Vidnes. So through the appeal for disarmament, the editor emphasizes the necessity to do 
away with constitutional monarchy by all means. He still underlines the importance of the 
peaceful path, namely the revision of the constitution. But if the revision does not occur, then 
the alternative solution will come up – revolution.
145
 Vidnes does not refer to any concrete 
country, his argument mainly concerns the European countries involved in the war. Two years 
later (in March 1917), though, the critique of constitutional monarchy becomes less radical. In 
the editorial The Revolution
146
, Vidnes even finds certain advantages in constitutional 
monarchy. The free Constitution, he writes, will play a major role in the future as with the 
help of the Constitution people may achieve required independence.  
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Although Vidnes writes about a revolution as an alternative method for achieving the working 
class‘ goals in Russia, a similar way in Norway does not seem reasonable for him. He refers to 
this issue in the editorial Rationing and the Workers
147
, where he describes a difficult situation 
due to the lack of flour and potatoes that Norwegian workers are faced with. In this regard, 
the editor refers to the Bolshevik experiences, such as creation of a workers‘ council which 
will possess all the power in the society. However, such a council would enormously reduce 
influence of the Norwegian Parliament – Storting – and commune authorities. Accordingly, 
Vidnes points out that the situations in both countries are completely different, therefore 
transferring to Norway revolutionary methods being used in Russia is not appropriate as it 
will ―create chaos and confusion‖. Thus, in practice Vidnes does not see the alleviation of 
workers‘ conditions in Norway by revolutionary means. In contrast, he acknowledges the 
supremacy of the Parliament and law.  
The emphasis of the rule of law may be traced in the editorial titled Party Split
148
. Vidnes 
demonstrates that the ideas supported by the radical wing of the DNA are unacceptable for the 
moderate party members. These ideas and beliefs are based on the rejection of 
parliamentarism and adherence to ―anarchistic Bolshevism‖ – something that Vidnes 
repudiates. When writing about the radical wing of the DNA, the editor refers specifically to 
Olav Scheflo
149
, who at that time was the editor of the newspaper Arbeidet. Vidnes denies 
Scheflo‘s statement that the newspaper Social-Demokraten is a principal opponent of 
revolution. ―When have we said that we are the opponents of the Russian Revolution?‖
 150
 
Vidnes asks. He does not argue with Scheflo regarding revolutionary means in Russia. 
According to Vidnes, a Russian social order is more likely to be profoundly changed by 
means of a revolution. The core of the dispute, however, lies in the development of socialism 
in Norway. Vidnes insists that in Norway socialism ought to be evolved through the 
Parliament and trade unions.  
Vidnes himself may appear unequivocal when he writes about socialism and its mission. Such 
sentiments are visible in the editorial Be Loyal as a Rebel
151
, where Vidnes draws unusual 
parallels between contemporary socialism and Jesus. He compares the resistance socialism 
meets today to the resistance Jesus met two thousand years ago. He assumes that through the 
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reforms of social order, socialists attempt to fulfill the fundamental ideas of Christianity. He 
underlines that a socialist has been seen as a rebel and apostate by rulers and the masses. 
Some part of the masses, he writes, has changed their opinions, but the rulers still adhere to 
this view. He poetically concludes that the day a socialist is no longer a rebel against the 
existing system – s/he becomes a traitor to the common cause. This editorial demonstrates 
how Vidnes perceives the socialist cause. Comparing socialism to Jesus, the author refers to 
the total dedication of and self-sacrificing attitude of the working class in order to change the 
unfair social order.   
5.1.5. Summary 
Four themes of Jacob Vidnes‘ editorship have been analyzed in this chapter – the working 
class‘s condition and the significance of the First of May, peace and disarmament, revolution 
in Russia and the Bolshevik rule, and radicalism and its expression in the studied editorials.  
Perhaps Vidnes‘ greatest concerns are the restoration of peace, implementation a disarmament 
policy, and improvement of the working class‘s position. The opinions on these issues have 
been quite consistent.  
But in the course of three years, from 1915 to 1918, Vidnes‘ perceptions on Russia and on the 
revolutionary situation in the country have been changed. Prior to 1917, Vidnes supports 
Russian social democrats primarily because of their view on the war, in other words, their 
peaceful intentions. Hence, the self / other nexus discussed in the chapter 3, at that period was 
more inclined to the inclusion of the Russian Other. The latter was not markedly different, as 
both Norwegian and Russian social democrats followed more or less the same direction – 
towards termination of the war. Moreover, before the revolution in Russia, Russian social 
democracy has been mentioned by Vidnes only in connection with promotion of peace with 
Germany and demands for disarmament. 
However, after 1917 the perceptions of Russia have become more inconsistent and oriented to 
the exclusion of the Russian Other. Vidnes‘ editorials demonstrate that he is an outspoken 
opponent of tsarism. He sympathizes with the Bolsheviks demands contributing to democratic 
rule. Democratic values for the editor are crucial. Therefore, when he feels that these fragile 
values start being threatened by the Bolsheviks (the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly), 
his support turns into a severe critique. However, Vidnes still justifies the revolutionary means 
used in Russia during the February Revolution as he considers them as a real possibility of 
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changing the tsar rule. But he does not think such a means is appropriate for Norwegian 
workers.  
5.2. The editorship of Olav Scheflo 
This chapter is devoted to the editorship of Olav Scheflo which covered the period from 2
d
 of 
April, 1918 to 9
th
 of May 1921. The analysis is based on fifty-three (53) editorials. Overall, 
the studied editorials embraced four topics relevant to the analysis: the Bolsheviks and the 
press, the world revolution and Norway, radical means of the working class‘ liberation, the 
Third International and the Party split. In the given analysis, these topics proved to be central 
under Scheflo‘s editorship. The following paragraphs are organized thematically.  
5.2.1. Bolshevism and the press 
At the convention of the DNA in April 1918, the radical wing of the Party obtained a majority. 
The parliamentarian line the reformists had followed was breached by the radical wing‘s 
victory.
152
 Accordingly, previous reformist editor Jacob Vidnes was replaced with the new 
editor – radical Olav Scheflo. In April 1918, when Scheflo started working as an editor of the 
newspaper Social-Demokraten, his support of Soviet Russia did not manifest itself as much as 
it did later. In the article The Labor Party‘s International Connections
153
, he accentuates the 
German social democracy‘s influence on the DNA, calling the former ―a brother-party‖. 
Scheflo is particularly sympathetic to the independent group within German social democracy 
led by Hugo Haase
154
. Scheflo writes that the German Social Democratic Party is an adherent 
of Karl Liebknecht
155
 and August Bebel
156
, and that the DNA is proud to assert that the 
principles and tactics of German social democracy accord with the DNA‘s principles and 
tactics.  
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Although Scheflo underlines the significance of German social democracy, the editorials on 
Soviet Russia and the Bolshevik rule occupy steadily more space in the newspaper‘s 
editorials. The support of Bolshevism becomes visible already in the early editor‘s articles and 
is expressed in a severe critique of the press which one way or another endorses the 
counterrevolution in Russia or criticizes the Bolshevik rule. Scheflo‘s critique is repeatedly 




, but also at the 
eponymous Swedish newspaper Social-Demokraten
159
. According to Scheflo, the Swedish 
paper condemns the Bolsheviks for the hunger and disorder in the country and predicts the 
victory of the counterrevolution. He calls it an agitation method and writes that it is ―quite 
unworthy of a social democratic paper‖
160
. The Swedish labor movement was less radicalized 
than the Norwegian for a number of reasons briefly described in the introduction to this thesis. 
Hence, among Scandinavian countries the radical wing won a majority only in Norway. In 
Sweden the main print organ of the Social Democratic Party Social-Demokraten was led by 
reformists.
161
 Therefore, the attitude to the Bolsheviks was not as supportive as in the 
Norwegian Social-Demokraten under Scheflo‘s editorship.  
Furthermore, the editor‘s critique of the bourgeois press concerns its inability to explain and 
comprehend what Bolshevism is.
162
 Scheflo refers to the definition of Bolshevism twice, 
without going into details. Firstly, in the editorial Bolshevism and Socialism
163
, Scheflo 
describes it as a proletarian movement with ―all the virtues of a proletarian movement‖ and 
considers that Bolshevism ―deserves to have the place of honor among the working class as it 
carries out the class struggle with utmost energy. <…> We do not need to know more in order 
to make an opinion on Bolshevism‖. Secondly, he comments on the issue four months later in 
November 1918. Through the prism of the bourgeois press‘ view on Bolshevism, he writes 
that it is ―a movement seeking to cause a conservative society‘s fall by means of violent, 
revolutionary actions beyond the Parliament.‖
164
 Scheflo does not argue with this presumable 
definition, albeit he calls it incomplete. This remark is important as it indicates that Scheflo 
realizes which means the Bolsheviks use to achieve power, but is still supportive of them.   
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As far as the reactions on Bolshevism in Norway are concerned, Scheflo regrettingly states 
that in ninety percent of the Norwegian newspapers, the Bolsheviks are represented as ―thugs 
who conduct the revolution only to quench their thirst for the upper class‘ blood‖
165
. Scheflo 
does not agree with such a description, as for him the Bolsheviks and the Russian working 
class fight as ―heroes <…> against the capitalist hydra <…>‖.
166
 As Lars A. Døvle Larssen 
remarks, for Scheflo the formation of public opinion among the Norwegian workers for the 
purpose of supporting and collaborating with the Soviet government became a whole 
project.
167
   
Although Scheflo appears to be the Bolsheviks‘ defender from the bourgeois press‘ 
accusations, he admits their imperfections. Still, he justifies the Bolsheviks‘ actions. In the 
editorial The Russian Scandal
168
, Scheflo writes ―the Bolsheviks are not angels <…> As most 
revolutionaries, they have executed many of their enemies, but most of these executions took 
place after the Allies‘ intervention encouraged the counterrevolutionaries and made them 
more intimidating.‖ It is meaningful for the editor to distinguish the Norwegian newspaper 
Social-Demokraten from the European propagandist anti-Bolshevik press and the press which 
criticizes the Bolsheviks‘ acts. In the editorial Fabrications against Russia
169
, he accuses the 
English, French and German conservative press of organized anti-Soviet propaganda.  
Scheflo assures the readers that the Soviet government‘s position is firm and impregnable
170
, 
despite all the bourgeois press‘ predictions on the victory of the counterrevolution in Russia. 
In the editorial titled The Revolution‘s Status
171
, Scheflo positively evaluates the development 
of the Russian Revolution, writing that its status ―has never been better than now‖. 
Furthermore, he writes: ―The Bolshevik rule has existed more than one year. Their power has 
not been weakened. All reliable surveillance sources claim that their power grows and has 
maintained order, they are supported by eighty million people, it succeeds in solving 
economic problems, it promotes people‘s sense for art, music and drama; it prepares a great 
plan for people‘s education – in fact, it carries out normal functions of a government.‖
172
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Accordingly, the editor is favorable to the Bolshevik rule, as he calls Bolshevism a common 
goal of all workers in Russia.
173
 
Thus, already in the beginning of Olav Scheflo‘s editorship, the newspaper Social-
Demokraten appears to be a ―Bolshevik friend‖
174
 and a ‗haven of truth‘ about the Bolsheviks 
and their rule in Russia. Scheflo frequently reveals what he calls the bourgeois press‘ bad 
intentions to blacken the revolution in Russia and the Bolsheviks‘ activity. He persuades the 
readers that the Bolsheviks‘ actions are supported by the Russian working class and are 
accompanied with the class struggle which is vital for other European countries as well. In the 
next paragraph, Scheflo‘s expectations of the world revolution and Norway‘s role in it will be 
discussed. 
5.2.2. The World Revolution and Norway 
Olav Scheflo‘s editorials are a notable example of how ardently the radical socialist left in 
Europe awaited the world revolution. In 1919 Scheflo writes that ―it is only a question of time 
and months when abusive Europe liberates itself from capitalism‘s rusty chains and fully 
enjoys its hard-earned freedom.‖
175
 The Russian Revolution considerably contributed to such 
an expectation. It has shown that power can be seized by means of a coup.
176
 ―The events in 
Russia must necessarily have considerable effects on the whole world. Nothing is stronger 
than the power of an example and the speech of a fact‖, the editor writes.
177
 Referring to the 
same issue in the editorial Peace and Revolution
178
, Scheflo claims that the ―Russian 
Bolsheviks have shown the world that a socialist revolution is no longer a beautiful dream, a 
utopia <…> but a real fact.‖ Furthermore, in several European countries such as Hungary and 
Austria there were social disturbances and tendencies towards revolt
179
, which denoted the 
inevitability of a revolution.  
In particular, the hope for the world revolution appeared feasible during the German 
revolution of 1918—1919.
180
 Scheflo is enthusiastic about the events in Germany. In this 
regard, he refers to the Russian Revolution ―The German revolution has not performed its 
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historical mission before it comes at the level <kommet i plan> of the Russian Revolution.‖
181
 
He compares the revolutions in Germany and Russia and comes to a conclusion that the only 
difference between them is age – the Russian Revolution is one year older. In fact, there were 
more peculiarities in the course of events which led to the revolutions in Germany and Russia. 
Scheflo‘s aspiration to portray both revolutions as similar demonstrates his approval of such a 
means of seizing power and indicates that two instances are harder to call an accident. In 
contrast to the conservative press, Scheflo characterizes the German revolution as Bolshevik. 
―The workers‘ and soldiers‘ councils have power – there is nothing to add‖, the editor 
writes.
182
 In the events in Russia and Germany, Scheflo sees the stimulus to the similar 
developments in England and France.
183
 Moreover, these events are significant for the editor 
as they, in his opinion, may accelerate the commencement of the period of socialism
184
, which 
in turn is a ―living condition for all countries‖
185
.    
In this respect, Norway is not an exception – the country ought to be a part of a socialist 
world. Socialism for Scheflo is a synonym for ―the economic and social liberation of the 
working class‖
186
. He repeatedly points out that the revolution in Norway is inevitable.
187
 In 
the editorial devoted to the day of 1
st
 of May, 1919
188
, Scheflo claims the following regarding 
Norway, ―We avoided the war, but we fortunately! do not avoid – the revolution. In this 
country the domination of the capitalist class will also soon be replaced with the society, 
where no one longer can live at a cost of other people‘s work, but where everyone who wants 
to work may enjoy the fruits of common welfare.‖ A week later, the editor asserts that the 
capitalist world is about to collapse and that this collapse will embrace Norway. ―Therefore 
the Central Committee of the Party suggests that the working class should prepare itself for 
eventualities that might occur before and during a revolution‖
189
. Odd-Bjørn Fure invokes the 
Convention‘s resolution from May 1919 which concerns the main tendencies of the DNA‘s 
politics in the period. The latter includes a thesis that the capitalist world is about to break 
down and that whole Europe is experiencing the transition from capitalism to socialism.
190
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Thus, according to Olav Scheflo, the world revolution is feasible in Norway in the nearest 
future, and the working class‘ commitment might enormously accelerate it. In addition, the 
revolution in Norway is a real opportunity to liberate the Norwegian working class. In the 
next paragraph, Scheflo‘s ideas of the means and ways of conducting revolution and profound 
changes in the Norwegian society will be discussed. 
5.2.3. Non-parliamentarian means of the working class‘ liberation 
One of the central issues for the given analysis is by what means, in Scheflo‘s view, the 
working class‘ liberation should be carried out as it may indicate the Russian Revolution‘s 
impact. In 1918, the editor writes that parliamentarian means would ―naturally be the best‖
191
. 
He continues, however, that if this way does not prove its value, the other path will have to be 
chosen, namely general strikes, mass actions, and dictatorship.
192
 The mass actions are 
considered by the editor as a decisive means.
193
 These measures may be undoubtedly called 
radical and directly influenced by Bolsheviks‘ actions.   
In the editorial Revision of the Constitution or Revolution
194
, Scheflo invokes to reduce the 
age limit for voting from twenty-five to twenty-one years and provide conditions where each 
vote is equal. If these demands are not fulfilled, then non-parliamentarian ways or ―more or 
less anarchist ways‖
195
 to achieve it will be considered. The editor highlights that the working 
class needs peace and order, which the current state of affairs as well as the society are not 
able to provide them with. Therefore, workers are willing to create a new society, which can 
be established ―only by a revolutionary breach with the old conditions.‖
 196
 
Scheflo‘s position on the means of achieving changes in the society manifests itself in the 
editorial Social Democracy
197
. The editor asserts that such demands as universal suffrage, 
freedom of speech, the right of assembly, and parliamentarism are important. But they are not 
sufficient. The essential goal for Scheflo and his supporters is that working relations and 
living conditions are regulated by workers themselves, not by their ―exploiters‖. And this goal 
is so vital that if all the rights mentioned above do not accelerate the changes favorable for 
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workers, they need to be sacrificed. Thus, Scheflo underlines the importance of freedoms and 
parliamentarism anew, but does not exclude their nullification. 
Referring to the issue of parliamentarism, Scheflo expresses himself equivocally. According 
to the editor, parliamentarism is a form of rule applicable for a bourgeois society. 
Parliamentarism is ―absolutely appropriate in the age of capitalism‖
198
 and should be applied 
as long as capitalism exists. Scheflo does not write directly that he is an opponent of 
parliamentarism. On the contrary, he articulates that the DNA does not seek to eliminate it. 
But at the same time, he admits that for a socialist society parliamentarism is inappropriate. 
And since Scheflo assumes that the working class irrevocably moves towards socialism, 
parliamentarism is ―sentenced to death‖
199
. Scheflo‘s statements on parliamentarism and its 
close demise are linked to the Party‘s Central Committee‘s decision on the Party‘s strategy 
and tactics made in May 1919 and presented in the extraordinary Convention in June 1919. 
The Convention‘s resolution was that mass actions became a decisive means of implementing 
socialism. This decision, according to Odd-Bjørn Fure, made the parliamentarian activity play 
a ―secondary and supplementary role‖ in which the support of the non-parliamentarian actions 
and propaganda of the socialist ideas became major tasks.
200
  
Consequently, there appears a relevant question – what form of rule, according to Scheflo, is 
suitable for a society undergoing the revolution? The answer is easy to find in the editorials. 
In the article titled Parliamentarism and Revolution
201
, Scheflo argues that in revolutionary 
times the maintenance of a parliamentarian system is impossible. The only ―natural and 
possible form of rule is dictatorship‖
202
. It is dictatorship that can contribute to promoting the 
public good.
203
 The editor explains what dictatorship is by contrasting it to parliamentarism 
and to the negotiations between contradicting parties. Scheflo puts forward that dictatorship 
as a form of rule is distinguished by the fact that those who mutually agree on the main issue, 
dictate their will to the rest of a population.
204
 However, the author underlines that 
dictatorship can be morally just only when it leads to the abolition of capitalism and liberation 
of the working class.  
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As it has been mentioned before, Scheflo assumes that the working class in Norway is 





, Scheflo emphasizes the significance of workers‘ councils and socialization in 
Norway. The editor also suggests creating councils for peasants and fishermen. Such 
suggestions prove to be Bolsheviks‘ impact, since workers‘ councils played an essential role 
during the revolution in Russia. 
Olav Scheflo does not conceal his fascination for Soviet Russia, Bolsheviks and their 
methods. The editor considers such means as general strikes, dictatorship and specifically 
mass actions to be appropriate for Norway. If in 1918 Scheflo denies the Norwegian 
conservative press‘ accusations against Norwegian socialists of receiving financial support 
from the Soviet government
206
, then in 1920 Scheflo does not deny that the DNA is ready to 
accept financial support from ―other socialist parties‖ providing that the DNA needs it
207
. 
According to the numbers presented by Åsmund Egge and Terje Halvorsen, the Party 
apparently needed the other socialist parties‘ help. In August 1920 the DNA got 10 000 
Swedish crowns from the Comintern. In December 1920 there was worked out a budget for 
1921 in the amount of 180 000 crowns. In 1922 the Party asked the Comintern 130 000 
crowns, but got around a half of the amount in gold rubles. In 1923 the DNA got 33 000 
crowns.
208
    
Scheflo reiterates the importance of maintaining communication with the Soviet government 
on the official level. Commenting on the diplomatic breach between Sweden and Russia, 
Scheflo is concerned over the affection of these events for Norway. He describes the Swedish 
and Norwegian policies towards Russia as ―the same cowardice, the same falsehood, the same 
outright lies‖.
209
 Scheflo sees in the connections between Norway and Russia a considerable 
economic potential.
210
 He writes the following ―We should turn ourselves to the East, if we 
want to sell more than buy. We have to be in the Russian market. Those, who are not blind, 
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must be able to see that there are great opportunities for the Norwegian economy in Russia. If 
we neglect these opportunities, the crisis will be imminently close.‖
211
 
Perhaps, even more enthusiasm regarding foreign policy line, Scheflo expresses towards 
Scandinavia. He accentuates the necessity to collaborate with the rest of the Scandinavian 
working class. He explains this necessity by stating that great changes cannot happen only in 
one country independently of others. Three Scandinavian countries ought to support each 
other and come to a new social order together.
212
  
Thus, Scheflo‘s editorials demonstrate a direct impact of the Soviet government and its 
policies – the idea of workers councils and socialization, mass actions, general strikes, the 
abolition of parliamentarism in the future, and the establishment of dictatorship. However, not 
all the members of the DNA were willing to accept those changes, and the party was verging 
towards a split. In the following paragraph, Scheflo‘s view on the split and the affiliation to 
the International will be discussed.  
5.2.4. The International and the Party Split 
In 1919, after the radical wing of the Party obtained a majority, the issue on the affiliation to 
the Comintern was resolved positively.
213
 The first Comintern‘s Congress managed to gather 
only thirty-five representatives. A year later in July-August 1920 the Second Congress was 
held in Moscow. It was more successful as it involved 218 representatives from 124 
communist parties, 31 non-communist parties and 12 youth associations.
214
 By summer 1920 
the Bolshevik regime became stronger as the Bolsheviks had a leading position in the civil 
war against the White Army.
215
 Thus, at the Congress the Bolsheviks were in a special 
position – they had many delegates and possessed considerable moral and political influence. 
They asserted that it was necessary for the whole working class to ―take over the Bolsheviks‘ 
experiences, their political strategy and tactics‖.
216
  
There was a number of parties that affiliated to the Comintern, but in fact was too far from 
communism. Such a state of affairs troubled the Bolsheviks as the new parties could exert 
                                                 
211
 ―Norge og Russland,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1919.9.16.  
212
 ―Arbeidernes skandinavisme,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1919.8.26.  
213
 Egge, Komintern og krisen, 12. 
214
 Maurseth, Fra Moskvateser, 18. 
215
 The Bolshevik government represented by the Red Army fought against anti-Bolshevik Russian forces called 
the White Army as well as against interventionist anti-Bolshevik armies. The Red Army won the civil war with 
tremendous losses for the nation. Thus the Bolsheviks finally seized power in Russia. 
216
 Langfeldt, 29. 
54 
 
increasing influence on the Comintern‘s policies. Therefore, in order to prevent opportunists 
and centrists from having a considerable impact on the new Third International, the Twenty-
one Conditions of admission to the Comintern were issued.
217
 These Conditions primarily 
embraced the decisions made at the Moscow Congress in 1920 and as a result initiated inner 
conflicts within the DNA. For instance, the twelfth article of the Conditions declared that ―the 
parties belonging to the Communist International must be built on the basis of the principle of 
democratic centralism‖
218
. This principle combined both democracy, which allowed free and 
open discussion, and central control, which ensured party unity and discipline.
219
 The 
sixteenth article proclaimed that ―all decisions of the Congresses of the Communist 
International and decisions of its Executive Committee are binding on all parties belonging to 
the Communist International‖
220
. Finally, the last twenty-first condition is as follows: ―those 
party members who fundamentally reject the conditions and Theses laid down by the 
Communist International are to be expelled from the party‖
221
. 
Scheflo emphasizes the importance of the DNA‘s contact with international organizations. He 
writes that the social democracy isolated within geographic borders injures itself
222
. 
Therefore, when there is raised a question on the DNA‘s affiliation to the International, 
Scheflo aims to give a positive answer. The editor claims that the DNA is willing to accept the 
decisions taken in the Moscow Congress. He also mentions that these guidelines will be 
adapted in accordance with the conditions in Norway. The Congress in Moscow played a 
considerable role in the further Party split. In 1920 Scheflo writes that the party members who 
want to ―destroy the Parties‘ opinions must be withdrawn from the play and if necessary 
forced to leave the Party.‖
223
  
Scheflo does not overtly support the principle proclaimed in the Third International 
concerning the role of weapons in the working class‘ struggle against capitalists. The 
International states that it is a necessary condition. Scheflo reflects upon the question whether 
this principle is applicable for Norway, and his answer does not appear to be transparent. But 
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the editor does not conceal his willingness to let workers have the opportunity to carry 
weapons. The reason for Scheflo‘s standpoint is that the upper class has such an 
opportunity.
224
 Furthermore, Scheflo claims that it is the capitalist class who forces workers to 
protect themselves from the suppression by taking up arms.
225
  
As far as the principle of democratic centralism is concerned, Scheflo supports it and points 
out that the Congress in Moscow dared to use the ―sincere language‖ and attempted to speak 
directly.
226
 Meanwhile, it has been organized a conference in Brussels. It was ―one of the first 
manifestations of activity in the new League of Nations, which called upon to study ‗the 
financial crisis‘ and to seek remedies‖
227
. Scheflo draws a bipolar picture of a current order in 
Europe. He writes that there are two alternatives for German, French and other European 
workers – either Brussels or Moscow. Brussels is represented by ―financial misery, world 
bankruptcy, and a catastrophe‖, while Moscow is depicted as ―liberation from a capitalist 
system, the construction of social fellowship through the social revolution‖.
228
 Besides, 
Scheflo sees at least two tasks for the Third International. The first one is to organize the 
international working class in such a way that allows the latter to prevent ―a new world 
bloodbath‖ – it is possible only through the world revolution.
229
 The second task directly 




Scheflo‘s attitude to the Third International and its principles evokes the conservative and the 
right-wing socialist press‘ accusations against the DNA‘s radical wing of a blind following of 
Moscow orders and of introducing the so-called system of Moscow dictatorship in Norway.
231
 
Scheflo denies such a critique and reiterates that the DNA agrees with the principles 
proclaimed by the Moscow Congress, but it is vital for the Party to adapt them to the 
conditions peculiar to Norway and the DNA.
232
 Scheflo states that there is no intention to 
make the Party militarist, make the Party leadership rule over the other Party members, or that 
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As early as in 1918, Scheflo demonstrates that there is a group of people in the DNA who is 
not particularly supportive of the working class‘ actions in Russia. The editor writes ―Even 
within our party there are still people who lack an understanding of the Russian working 
class‘ fair struggle against the international reaction.‖
234
 Scheflo considers the word split to be 
wrong for designating the situation in the Party. The word shedding <avskalling> is in 
Scheflo‘s view more suitable.
235
 According to the editor, the DNA‘s positions are stronger 
than they have ever been.
236
 The editor is sure that if the new Party is established, it will not 
be the labor party in its essence as the proletarian elements will be inseparable from the 
radical wing.
237
 Thus, Scheflo‘s editorials in the studied period indicate that the editor shows 
solidarity with the principles proclaimed by the Congress in Moscow. He is willing to apply 
those decisions in Norway, despite the reformist wing‘s dissent with them. Scheflo underlines 
that the principles should be adapted to Norwegian conditions and the DNA policies. But in 
general, he fully approves the line of arguments made by the Congress.     
5.2.5. Summary 
Four topics have been reflected upon in this chapter, namely the Bolsheviks and the 
conservative press, world revolution and Norway, radical means of the liberation of the 
working class, and the Third International and the Party split.  
The analysis demonstrated that Olav Scheflo sympathized with the Bolshevik rule in Soviet 
Russia. He continually defended the Bolsheviks from the conservative press‘ accusations, and 
supported the revolution in Russia and its slogans. In Scheflo‘s view, the revolution in Russia 
and in Germany should advance the socialist revolutions in Europe. Norway is considered by 
him as one of the European countries where the working class actively prepares itself to carry 
out the class struggle and as a result decide upon social and economic conditions in the 
society. Therefore, the DNA‘s affiliation to the Third International and the support of its 
principles are important for the editor. Such an organization as the Third International that 
united socialists under the guidance of Soviet Russia is seen by Olav Scheflo as a tangible 
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means to accelerate the working class‘ victory over injustices committed by capitalists. 
Moreover, the means by which this victory is meant to be achieved was close to the means 
used by the Bolsheviks – mass actions, general strikes and dictatorship. Thus, Scheflo‘s 
editorship demonstrates that the self / other nexus of the Norwegian radical wing within the 
DNA is directed at inclusion of the Russian Other and furthermore at adherence and 
justification of its decisions and means.   
5.3. The editorship of Martin Tranmæl 
This chapter is devoted to the Social-Demokraten‘s editorials written by Martin Tranmæl. He 
was the editor of the Social-Demokraten from 1921 to 1949. The focus of this thesis lies in 
the period until April 1, 1923 when the newspaper was renamed Arbeiderbladet. The analysis 
is based on forty-four (44) editorials. All the studied editorials were tentatively divided into 
two large topics – the editor‘s attitude towards Soviet Russia and the Comintern‘s influence. 
5.3.1. Bolshevism and Soviet Russia 
Twenty out of forty-four editorials selected for this analysis directly refer to the Russian 
Revolution, Bolsheviks, and Soviet Russia. This paragraph examines how the aforementioned 
issues are represented in the editorials in the period from May 1921 to April 1923.  
For Martin Tranmæl the establishment of good neighborly relations with Soviet Russia 
appears important. The editor puts special emphasis on the trade links between Norway and 
Russia.
238
 For Tranmæl, the ratification of the trade agreement with the Soviet government by 
the Storting in October 1921 signifies a political recognition of Soviet Russia. He writes that 
such developments between the countries will inevitably lead to the normalization of their 
relations.
239
 Tranmæl underlines that the DNA has persistently fought for ―reciprocity and 
understanding between Norway and Russia‖, therefore, this agreement has proved that the 
Party‘s endeavors have not been fruitless.
240
  
Another indication of the importance of the connections with Russia for the editor is the 
initiative proposed by the Norwegian Minister of Justice Otto B. Halvorsen. He suggested 
banning entry of the literature written by Vladimir Lenin in Norway. The editor calls such a 
proposition ―idiotic‖ and characterizes it as a deliberate obstacle to workers‘ liberation created 
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by the powerful ―exploiting class‖.
241
 In this regard, Tranmæl appeals to right-wing socialist 
leaders to stop reading anti-Bolshevik literature and draws their attention to Karl Marx and 
other socialist classics.
242
 He reiterates that Europe cannot do without Russia. Therefore 
certain countries seek to restore commercial relations with Russia.
243
    
Overall, the recognition of Soviet Russia appears to be a significant issue for Martin Tranmæl. 
When the leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) Samuel Gompers opposed the 
recognition of the Soviet government, Tranmæl criticized the AFL. The editor presumes that 
the AFL cannot be described as an organization for workers. The reason for such an 
assumption is that the members of the AFL should pay the affiliation fee from two dollars to 
three hundred dollars – which Tranmæl considers unacceptable. Moreover, the editor asserts 
that Gompers is ―a tool for capitalist power and not at all a ‗worker‘s leader‘‖.
244
  
Another notable example of Tranmæl‘s sympathy for the Bolsheviks is the case against social-
revolutionaries taking place from 8
th
 of June to 7
th
 of August 1922 in Moscow. In spring and 
summer of 1922, this process was one of the most important events in Soviet Russia‘s 
political life.
245
 The process was initiated by the Bolsheviks. The social-revolutionaries were 
prosecuted for the counterrevolutionary activity and the organization of terror attacks against 
Bolshevik leaders. There were two groups of defendants. The first group consisted of twenty-
two people who did not confess. The second group consisted of people who became 
Communists by 1922 and had to ‗disclose‘ crimes of the Socialist Revolutionary Party.
246
 
Twelve out of twenty-two defendants were sentenced to capital punishment. However, the 
execution of the sentence was postponed until the next socialist revolutionary terrorist action. 
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The Social-Demokraten‘s editor approves the result of the case and calls it ―the only fair and 
right‖
248
 outcome. In Tranmæl‘s view, the Soviet government ―defends its fatherland from the 
obvious enemies and traitors to their country‖
249
. Thus, the attitude towards the sentence is 
quite indicative of Tranmæl‘s strong support of the Bolsheviks and their methods. 
Referring to the Bolsheviks‘ methods, Tranmæl‘s opinion on parliamentarism should be 
mentioned. Tranmæl does not consider parliamentarism to be a logical continuation of the 
Norwegian political system. In contrast, the DNA attempts to make a principally new basis for 
a new society. At the heart of this basis lies work and fellowship. Accordingly, any work 
directed at stabilization of old conservative institutions should be undermined as the new 
society requires new institutions that meet the needs of workers‘ fellowship.
250
 According to 
Tranmæl, parliamentarism in the current situation should be used as a mechanism for 
revolutionary preparations. The decisive means of struggle should be mass actions that have 
also been supported by previous editor Olav Scheflo.
251
 Furthermore, the formation of 
workers‘ councils as a basis for socialization is a major issue in the workers‘ liberation 
process. The editor highlights the workers‘ liberation must be fulfilled by the workers 
themselves.
252
 The goal of socialization was to suppress an access to the economic 
exploitation of other people.
253
  
From 1921 to 1928, the Soviet government applied the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
Tranmæl evaluates NEP as a temporary measure caused by the international situation. In spite 
of the conservative press‘ statements on Soviet Russia‘s abandonment of communism and its 
principles, the editor points at the Soviet government ability to admit the existence of 
temporary hardships. In particular, he refers to Vladimir Lenin, who ―honestly and bravely 
points at all the mistakes having been made, faces all the truth first of all the most unpleasant, 
and admits all defeats…‖
254
 Tranmæl does not doubt that the Soviet government will manage 
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to gain a foothold in the future
255
 as long as it will be in a position to make a commercial 
deals with other countries.
256
 Tranmæl does not share the conservative press‘ opinion that the 
concession system
257
 in Soviet Russia means Bolshevism‘s failure. According to the editor, 
the concession policy is an illustration of ―the pure practical politics‖.
258
  
The editor is convinced that in spite of hardships, the state of affairs in the Soviet Russia is 
stable. In the editorial commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Russian Revolution
259
, 
Tranmæl emphasizes that the current position of the Russian Workers' and Peasants' 
government is impregnable. According to Tranmæl, the Soviet government has been forced to 
compromise by utilizing NEP in terms of economy. But in terms of politics its adherence to 
communist principles is solid. For the editor, Soviet Russia proves that the working class can 
govern a country. Therefore, Tranmæl unambiguously urges the Norwegian working class to 
―follow the Russian example‖ and ―learn from Russians, from their mistakes as well as from 
their prudence‖. Furthermore, the editor insists that the Norwegian working class has not fully 
contributed to the Russian and world revolutions. The contribution ought to manifest itself in 
the ―liberation‖ of Norwegian workers and in the work for creating conditions for the social 
revolution in Norway.
260
 Thus, the attitude towards revolutionary Russia is presented as a 
litmus test for being or not being antirevolutionary and antisocialist.
261
 The editor claims that 
those who ―cast doubt on such a struggling working class as the Russian, have positioned 
themselves in the class of workers‘ enemies and have to be treated accordingly.‖
262
  
In general, Tranmæl‘s attitude towards the Bolsheviks‘ leader Vladimir Lenin appears highly 
respectful. In the editorial Rosa Luxemburg against Lenin
263
, the editor refers to the Junius 
Pamphlet
264
 written by Rosa Luxemburg
265
 in 1915 (i.e. before the Russian Revolution and 
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the Bolshevik‘s seizure of power). According to Tranmæl, the pamphlet contains the critique 
of Lenin‘s tactics. And later, Rosa Luxemburg realized that the brochure would do more harm 
than good and therefore did not publish it. However, Paul Levi, Luxemburg‘s lawyer  who 
was expelled from the German Communist Party, published the brochure out of revenge. 
Hence, Tranmæl attempts to demonstrate that the arguments set forth in the brochure 
disaccord with eventual Luxemburg‘s opinions. He concludes that the Russian Revolution 
―cannot be damaged by Paul Levi‘s villainy‖.
266
 
Interestingly, in the editorial Russians in Genoa
267
 Tranmæl touches upon the self / other 
relations. The author disapproves ‗customary‘ views on Russian barbarism and west European 
civility. The issue has emerged in regard to the disarmament question in the Genoa 
conference
268
. Tranmæl sarcastically points out that the ―representative of ‘bloodthirsty‘ 
barbarism‖ Georgy Chicherin
269
 openly advocated disarmament while the ―proponent of 
civilization and culture‖ French representative Jean Louis Barthou considered Chicherin‘s 
idea ridiculous and was reluctant to listen to his speech. 
In December 1922 Soviet Russia initiated a conference with representatives from Poland, 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania in Moscow. The agenda of the Moscow conference
270
 
was the reduction of arms. The editor underlines that the conference is also significant for 
Norway, since her neighboring country Finland participates in it. Tranmæl points out that the 
outcome of the conference will directly influence relations between Finland and Norway. In 
other words, if the Finnish delegation signs a peace treaty with Soviet Russia, then ―good 
relations between Norway and Finland will be strengthened. If not, the Norwegian working 
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class‘ mistrust of the current rule in Finland will be increased.‖
271
 Such a presentation of the 
issue indicates how important the Soviet government and its actions were for Tranmæl. 
Thus, Martin Tranmæl‘s supportive and favorable attitude towards the Russian Revolution, 
Vladimir Lenin, Soviet government and its actions has been demonstrated. The Soviet 
government is represented as a state seeking for peace with a firm, open and honest leader. 
The editor appeals to the Norwegian working class to be as decisive as the Russian working 
class and supports the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, non-parliamentarian 
methods and mass actions.     
5.3.2. Amsterdam International and Profintern 
 
In July 1921 the first Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern) took 
place in Moscow. The formation of the Profintern was initiated by the Comintern. The 
organization was supposed to be a counterbalance to the social democratic Amsterdam 
International. The Comintern‘s concern appeared to be quite reasonable, as in 1920 the 
Amsterdam International included twenty-three million members (in the following years the 
membership was considerably reduced).
272
 
In the Constitution of the Profintern, the purpose to reduce affiliation to the Amsterdam 
International was specified: 
―We have now to make clear the character of the Red International, and also to devise ways and means of 
mobilising the workers within the union movement of this country, who are willing to come under its banner for 
the purpose of winning the whole union movement and its central organisations away from the yellow 




In this regard, the Comintern made an appeal for the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation 
to resign from the Amsterdam International and affiliate to the Profintern. This appeal 
manifested itself in the Social-Demokraten. In June 1921 the editor accuses the Amsterdam 
International of undermining the Profintern and splitting the trade union movement on the 
ground of its ―aggressive behavior towards the revolutionary elements within the working 
class.‖
274
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The editor‘s attitude towards the Amsterdam International appears unambiguous. He appeals 
to the Norwegian trade unions to resign from this organization. Such an attitude is determined 
by Tranmæl‘s opinion that the Amsterdam International is completely insignificant and 
headed by reformists and social patriots.
276
 In the author‘s view, the latter are synonymous to 
traitors to international solidarity. Tranmæl characterizes the Amsterdam International first of 
all as a political and then as a trade union organization. In contrast to social patriotic spirit of 
the Amsterdam International, the Profintern‘s goal is to ―gather all revolutionary trade unions 
in one international struggle organization <kamporganisation>‖. Hence, the organization has 




In spite of Tranmæl‘s desire to leave the Amsterdam International, there was some uncertainty 
in the DNA‘s leadership. The chairman of the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation Ole 
Lian and the chairman of The Norwegian Union of Iron and Metal workers Halvard Olsen 
doubted. One of the reasons for their uncertainty was that there were many social democrats 
in the Confederation who had just left the DNA due to the Party split and who most likely 
would not have liked the idea of affiliation to the Profintern. As a result, the Confederation‘s 
board resolved to postpone the discussion of this issue until the Congress in 1923. The 
Comintern‘s reaction was not slow to arrive. The Profintern sent a letter where the strong 
appeal for the DNA‘s affiliation to the organization was expressed. In addition, the Comintern 
urged the Party to impose sanctions against those members who voted for the postponement 
of the discussion on the Profintern‘s affiliation at the Confederation‘s board meeting. This 
letter evoked an argument in the Confederation. Consequently, in November 1921 the party 
delegation left for Moscow to negotiate on this issue with the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern. The importance of the negotiations was demonstrated by the members of the 
delegation: Martin Tranmæl, Olav Scheflo, Ole O. Lian and Halvard Olsen. The outcome of 
the negotiations was that the Confederation should have affiliated to the Profintern in a short 
time. But no deadline was indicated.
278
  
The results of the negotiations were reflected on the Social-Demokraten pages. The issue of 
the withdrawal from the Amsterdam International is addressed in the editorials with renewed 
vigor. The editor reduces the discussion regarding the International to one question – Moscow 
                                                 
276
 ―Amsterdam-Internationalen.‖ Social-Demokraten, 1921.6.14. 
277
 ―Den faglige Internationale,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1921.9.2.  
278
 Egge, Komintern og krisen, 15-17.  
64 
 
or Amsterdam or in other words, for or against the social revolution? The communist mass 
parties can be established, according to Tranmæl, only through withdrawal from 
Amsterdam.
279
 He repeatedly underlines that workers can be united only on the basis of 
revolutionary socialism, namely communism. The role of the Profintern, according to 
Tranmæl, is being a ―common denominator for all struggling trade unions in all countries.‖
280
 
One of the main drawbacks of the Amsterdam International for the editor is that it has not 
performed a consolidating function between classes. Furthermore, instead of contributing to 
workers‘ international struggle on the unifying revolutionary ground, the Amsterdam 
International has sought to collaborate with the League of Nations.
281
 Therefore, Tranmæl 
urges ―class-conscious and revolutionary workers to oppose right-wing socialist associations, 
especially when they act under a furtive mask like the Amsterdam International.‖
282
 
In the editorial titled Amsterdam
283
 dated April 1922, Martin Tranmæl announces that the 
Trade Union Confederation voted for its withdrawal from the Amsterdam International with 
nine against four votes. Whether the Confederation affiliates to Moscow International will be 
decided at the Congress. The Confederation‘s inclination to more radical developments is also 
illustrated by the unanimous decision taken at the Confederation‘s last Congress regarding 
socialization. The policy of socialization signified that the means of production should be 
owned by the society, the economy based on rivalry and profit should be replaced with 
planned economy and distribution, the management of economy should be considerably 
democratized through the council system.
284
 In addition, the majority voted for a council 
system, the working class‘ dictatorship, and mass actions as a crucial means in the struggle for 
socialization. Tranmæl frequently refers to the Confederation and its state of affairs as he 
considers it to be inextricably linked to the DNA. He states that the trade union movement 
and the Party work side by side in their struggle for actual revolutionary demands.
285
 The 
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Thus, the direct influence from the Comintern on the DNA and the Norwegian Trade Union 
Confederation has been demonstrated. The editorials on the theme of trade union 
Internationals were closely linked to the Comintern‘s requests. In the next paragraph, the idea 
of the united front and the DNA‘s role in it will be discussed. 
5.3.3. The United Front 
In the editorials Tranmæl frequently refers to the issue of the working class solidarity and 
consolidation. But in the context of split processes in the Party, these notions have been 
impeded. The editor emphasizes that the DNA‘s task is to gather the working class. In order to 
fulfill this task, Tranmæl considers it necessary to purge the Party. The Party comprised of 
―heterogeneous elements and mutually hostile wings can never be a sterling solid party to be 
relied upon.‖
287
 Tranmæl addressed this severe criticism imbued with intransigence to the 
right-wing socialists in November 1921.  
A month later Tranmæl‘s perception and rhetoric regarding right-wing socialists changed and 
it was linked to the theses on the united front sent out by the Comintern. The notion of the 
united front was spread out by the Comintern‘s Executive Committee in December 1921 and 
passed at the Committee‘s meeting in February 1922. The theory of the united front was based 
on the working class consciousness. The Comintern realized that there were workers in other 
parties who had a need for the fellowship and solidarity in their struggle. But they lacked an 
understanding of the working class‘ historical mission, namely seizure of power and creation 
of a socialist society. The Comintern comprehended that such groups of workers comprised a 
considerable part of the reformist Amsterdam International. Therefore, the idea of the united 
front came in useful since the demand for the unity in the struggle for the better standard of 
living among workers was increasing.
288
 Hence, the motto To the masses! became central. In 
such a manner, Communists attempted to underline that the class struggle was primarily 
concentrated no longer around the revolution, but around such daily demands of workers as a 
higher salary, eight-hour working day and the right to vacations. With the help of the united 
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In January 1922 Tranmæl points out that there are no highly dissimilar opinions among 
workers on the international capitalist class.
290
 Hence, it might be a common ground for 
creating the united proletarian front. In connection with this idea, it was decided by the Trade 
Union Confederation to organize a common conference for both the Amsterdam International 
and the Profintern. According to the editor, pursuing workers‘ salary standard and an eight-
hour working day, a struggle against imperialist military and war plans should have served as 
a common ground for both ‗participants‘. However, the Trade Union Confederation‘s 
initiative was declined by the Amsterdam International.
291
   
The idea of the united front brought out a new disagreement in the Party. As Per Maurseth 
points out, the argument on the united front in Norway primarily concerned how to adapt the 
united front idea to the Norwegian conditions. One group of the Party members sought to 
create a united front consisting of all workers on the basis of demands common for wage-
earners and small manufacturers. So, the adaptation of the united front idea would manifest 
itself in appeal for the part of the electorate of the party Venste
292
. The other group sought to 
gather the real working class in the Confederation of Trade Unions and the DNA. As a result, 
there were held three meetings on the united front tactics within four weeks. And the decision 
was to support the Comintern‘s tactics over the united front.
293
 Thus, the Comintern‘s 
influence also manifested itself in the united front tactics.  
5.3.4. The relations with the Comintern 
A series of editorials under Tranmæl‘s editorship are devoted to the Comintern and the 
Twenty-one Conditions. The editor argues that the Third International gives the Norwegian 
labor movement a ―stronger moral and political support than anything else.‖
294
  
In March 1921, the DNA‘s convention resolves to be affiliated to the Twenty-one 
Conditions.
295
 However, it has implied certain objections and questions regarding the 
Conditions. One of them is the Comintern‘s requirement for abolition of the collective 
membership in the DNA. The majority of the DNA‘s member has been collectively affiliated 
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to the Party through trade unions. But the Conditions demanded that the party-members of the 
Comintern had to be based on the individual membership.
296
 This was quite a serious 
requirement for the Party taking into consideration links between the Trade Union 
Confederation and the DNA. Per Maurseth demonstrates close relations between these two 
entities comparing them to ―conjoined twins‖.
297
 In October 1921, Tranmæl writes that the 
potential DNA‘s objections are immaterial in comparison to the unifying views on mass 
actions, the system of councils and dictatorship.
298
 A month later, he reiterates that there ―is no 
shame to accept the guidelines from Moscow when they accord with the Congress‘ decisions 
and are of benefit to the working class‖.
299
 
Tranmæl does not support the previous editor‘s position on the guidelines coming from 
Moscow. For Scheflo, adherence to and following the Moscow guidelines seems to be 
reasonable developments of the party line. As for Tranmæl, he prefers consulting with the 
International instead of asking for guidelines.
300
 
However, the editor approves the principle of democratic centralism. He writes that there 
appears a risk of reformist opportunism, if the Party is not strongly centralized. The editor 
realizes and admits that the Party‘s collective understandings and opinions are above the 
individual‘s understanding and opinion. Tranmæl calls such a perception ―intellectual 
abdication‖.
301
 The principle of democratic centralism, according to Tranmæl, played a crucial 
role during the Russian Revolution of 1917. Without the centralized Communist Party, 
impregnable leadership and an audacious military coup initiative, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat would not be established.
302
 
The relations between the editor of the Social-Demokraten and the Comintern become 
gradually more complicated. Tranmæl is disappointed by the Comintern‘s interference in the 
inner affairs of the DNA. The interference has manifested itself in what is called by historians 
the September letter <septemberbrevet>. The letter dated September 23, 1922 contained the 
critique of the DNA. The Comintern criticized the Party for the lack of the Communist 
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discipline and inadequate fulfillment of the Party reorganization.
303
 In particular, the 
newspaper Social-Demokraten and its editor Tranmæl have drawn strong criticism from the 
Comintern. Nevertheless, the editor seeks to smooth over different opinions and reach an 
understanding that will prevent a breach between the International and the DNA.
304
 However, 
Tranmæl is not ready to sacrifice what he calls ―certain freedom of movement‖ in order to 
please the Comintern. He reiterates that the interference in the inner order of the Party by the 
Comintern will only diminish its reputation.
305
 Tranmæl insists that large, developed and 
determined national parties, in other words, parties that are beneficial for the Comintern, can 
only be established if they are built on the specific conditions for their countries and if they 
have certain freedom.
306
 The editor emphasizes that Norwegian workers desire to participate 




In autumn 1922, the Comintern held the Fourth Congress. The inner crises of the party-
members of the Third International – French, Italian, and Norwegian – were on the agenda. 
The question on the crisis in the Norwegian Labor Party was prepared by the special 
commission led by Nikolay Bukharin. Meanwhile, the disagreement in the DNA continued: 
there were discussions both on democratic centralism and discipline. 
In December 1922, Tranmæl claims that the DNA withdraws from the Comintern. The Party 
members have felt the direct threat to the DNA‘s sovereignty in inner issues. The majority 
considers it as a damage to the Norwegian working class and therefore to the international 
workers‘ movement. Furthermore, it is crucial for the editor and, as he writes, for Norwegian 
workers that the collaboration with the Comintern is ―based on trust and reciprocity, not on 
the superior and subordinate relations‖. Nevertheless, Tranmæl highlights that despite the 
DNA‘s withdrawal from the Comintern, its political relations with Soviet Russia and the Third 
International will remain the same.
308
  
Tranmæl accuses the right-wing socialists of having waited for the opportunity to split the 
DNA with as many supporters as possible. The Twenty-one Conditions have become a great 
                                                 
303
 Egge, Komintern og krisen, 36. 
304
 ―Internationalen,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1922.10.14.  
305
 ―En livsbetingelse,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1922.10.16. 
306
 ―Enkelt og letvint,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1922.10.25. 
307
 ―Organisationsspørsmaalet,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1922.10.28.  
308
 ―Stillingen til Internationalen,‖ Social-Demokraten, 1922.12.22.  
69 
 
opportunity for the reformists.
309
 He considers those who support the split to be capitalists. He 




5.3.5 The  newspaper‘s name 
From 1923 the contradictions between communism and social democracy started growing 
immensely. The two flows considered the way to socialism differently. Communists referred 
to the Russian example and were prepared to carry out socialism by means of revolution, 
abolishment of parliamentarian democracy and the proletariats‘ dictatorship. Socialists, 
conversely, sought to parliamentarian democracy based on universal suffrage.
311
  
Gradually Tranmæl himself retreats from the designation social democratic, as in most 
countries social democratic parties are discredited. They betrayed the class struggle and the 
International. The actual revolutionary socialist, according to the editor, are referred to such a 
description as communist.
312
 The change of the newspaper‘s name is perhaps also connected 
to Tranmæl‘s perception that meaning of the notion social democratic is equal to the notion of 
a right-wing socialist.
313
 The editor associates the newspaper, its content and target audience 
with workers who read Communist papers.
314
 In this regard, the choice of the name 
Arbeiderbladet (Workers‘ Paper) seems to be reasonable. Furthermore, the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern demanded that such designations as social democrat and 
democrat to be exterminated from all the newspapers‘ names of the party-members. 
5.3.6. Summary 
The focus of this part of the chapter was placed on the Social-Demokraten‘s editorials written 
by Martin Tranmæl on the following topics – the attitude to Soviet Russia and Bolsheviks as 
well as the Comintern and its influence. Tranmæl expresses himself quite respectful and 
positive about the Soviet government, its decisions and leader. Tranmæl appeals consistently 
for the Norwegian working class to follow the Russian working class‘ example. Besides, the 
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connections with Soviet Russia are important for the editor. He reiterates that the commercial 
connections with the neighborly Soviet Republic are beneficial for Norway.  
As far as the Comintern is concerned, Tranmæl‘s editorials are not unequivocal. He seems 
very supportive of the Comintern and is willing to collaborate with the organization. The 
editor appears convinced that this collaboration will be fruitful as the Comintern‘s decisions 
are directly referred to the working class‘ needs. However, the September letter, or in other 
words, the Comintern‘s interference in the inner affairs of the Party disappoints Tranmæl. He 
attempts to hold a contact with the Comintern until the Party‘s sovereignty and independence 
are put in the shade. Although he has argued for following the Russian example, with the 
course of time he claims that specific conditions in countries should first and foremost taken 
into consideration. He realizes that the Norwegian working class is not ready to take over 
ready templates from Russia and utilize them in Norway.  
The self / other relations in this case are reshaping from the idealization of the Russian Other 
to its criticism. On the one hand, Tranmæl underlines the necessity of Russia for Europe and 
tends to inclusion of the Russian Other. On the other hand, when the Russian Other exercises 
its influence on the Party / Norway / Self, Tranmæl seeks to exclude it.    
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The source material for this thesis, namely 125 editorials written by three editors Jacob 
Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl were analyzed in order to detect the portrayals of 
the Russian Revolution in the DNA‘s print organ, Social-Demokraten, and what influence the 
latter exerted on the labor movement in Norway.  
6.1. Reformist Jacob Vidnes 
The editors‘ opinions on the Russian Revolution in accordance with its broad and narrow 
definitions were diverse. In the editorials written by reformist editor Jacob Vidnes prior to the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, Russian social democrats including the Bolsheviks were 
portrayed in a favorable light. First and foremost, Vidnes‘ view was linked to the peaceful 
intentions of the Russian social democracy, its aspiration to end and prevent armament of the 
Russian army by protesting against the country‘s military build-up. All this was in line with 
the international left-wing socialists‘ perceptions of the situation; such a behavior was 
expected from other European socialists as it could lead to the end of the devastating First 
World War. In this regard, Vidnes treated Russia as a significant player on the arena of 
international social democracy.  
He was supportive of the February Revolution of 1917 which resulted in the abolishment of 
monarchy. Vidnes claimed that it was the task of the world‘s social democracy to save the 
Russian Revolution as he expected a further development of democratic institutions in Russia. 
In 1917 he evaluated the conditions in Russia as a positive evolvement leading to profound 
democratic changes in the society. Therefore, the Bolsheviks as leaders of the revolution and 
speakers for democracy were favored by the editor. He accepted the Bolsheviks as carriers of 
a democratic development in the Russian society which had been oppressed by the absolute 
monarchy for centuries. But when the Bolsheviks seized power by the forceful dissolution of 
the Constituent Assembly, they became as unappealing for Vidnes as tsar Nicolay II – they 
were suppressors. Hence, when Vidnes remarked the dictatorial ambitions of the Bolsheviks 
after the October Revolution, his attitude changed considerably. He called the October 
Revolution a coup, not a genuine social, political, economic and cultural changes in the 
society. Nevertheless, shortly after Vidnes sounded less critical calling, for instance, the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a necessary measure.  
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Vidnes recognized that the situations in Norway and Russia were different. Therefore, his 
assessments regarding the use of parliamentarian and non-parliamentarian means in Norway 
and Russia were dissimilar. He concluded that for Russia the revolutionary means, in other 
words, profound changes in the society could be probably most effectively achieved only 
beyond the Parliament. Vidnes was not an opponent of revolution as a means of reformation 
in a country, but a revolutionary path was, in his opinion, not appropriate for Norway. 
According to Jacob Vidnes, the developments in Norway should be inextricably linked to the 
Parliament and its decisions, the rule of law was indispensable and the importance of the trade 
unions in the process of the improvement of the working class‘ positions was enormous.  
6.2. Radical Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl  
Olav Scheflo‘s views on Bolshevism were positive and not only because it had peaceful 
intentions, but more importantly because it set an example of the working class‘ ability to rule 
the country. He was inspired by the Russian case and expected similar actions from 
Norwegian workers. Scheflo treated the Bolsheviks with considerable respect and called them 
heroes and friends. The editor admitted the regime‘s brutality towards its enemies, but 
justified it as a necessary action. He did not doubt that the Soviet government‘s position is 
stable, and believed that anti-Bolshevik propaganda in the conservative press could not shatter 
it. He approved parliamentarian means of change, but only in a capitalist society. Scheflo 
claimed that the new fair society could be built only by the breach with the old institutions. If 
the Parliament was not able to introduce rapid positive changes for the working class‘ living 
conditions, it should be abandoned, as it was a political tool for capitalists.   
He considered parliamentarism to be appropriate only under capitalism. In his opinion, 
socialist society required another political system – dictatorship. However, this statement was 
not unconditional. Scheflo justified dictatorship only if it led to the suppression of capitalism 
and the liberation of the working class.   
Martin Tranmæl‘s attitude towards the Russian Revolution was also positive. He urged the 
readers to look at the Russian example and learn from it. He claimed that those who had any 
doubts regarding the Russian working class and its actions were the enemies of the 
international working class. He also underlined peaceful intentions of the Soviet government 
and was supportive of the New Economic Policy in Russia condemned by the bourgeois press 
as divergence from the socialist path. As well as Scheflo he was certain about a solid position 
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of the Bolshevik government that could not be undermined by the stinging criticism of the 
bourgeois press. Tranmæl considered parliamentarism as a tool for revolutionary preparations 
in Norway. But parliamentarism was not a logical continuation of the political development in 
Norway, in the editor‘s view. 
Thus, according to the source material for this thesis the three editors‘ understandings and 
perceptions of the Russian Revolution were diverse. Nevertheless, there were common 
themes that went through the editorials of J. Vidnes, O. Scheflo and M. Tranmæl. Both Vidnes 
and Scheflo defended the Bolsheviks from the bourgeois press‘ criticism, required the revision 
of the Constitution or revolution (though Vidnes did not refer to Norway in this regard), and 
appealed to social solidarity. Vidnes and Tranmæl underlined a peaceful intention of the 
Soviet government and a prominent role of trade unions for the improvement of the working 
class‘ conditions. While both Scheflo and Tranmæl as the representatives of the radical wing 
of the Party emphasized the necessity to follow the example set by the Russian working class 
and the Bolsheviks, the significance of commercial relations with Russia, the adaptation of 
the Twenty-one provisions of the Comintern to Norwegian conditions, and the firm and stable 
position of the Soviet government. One of the clear distinguishing features in the editorials of 
Scheflo and Tranmæl was the role of the Comintern. Scheflo argued that following the 
Comintern‘s guidelines was a logical development of the Party, which would lead to the 
revolution in Norway, while Tranmæl considered that the Comintern should have been 
perceived by the DNA as a consulting organ, but not the organization whose guidelines had to 
be unquestionably followed by the Party.  
6.3. The radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement 
The Russian Revolution contributed to the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement. 
It manifested itself in the editors‘ debates on non-parliamentarian ways of changes in the 
society as well as the Twenty-one Conditions and Comintern‘s interference in the Party‘s 
inner affairs. The impact of the Comintern which resulted in the Party split of 1921and 1923 
came through the debates on the issues of the working class‘ armament in its struggle against 
capitalism, withdrawal from the Amsterdam International and affiliation to the Profintern, the 
transition from the collective to the individual membership, tactics of the united front, change 
of the newspaper‘s name and the reception of financial support from the Comintern. The 
peaceful development of the Norwegian labor movement was among other things determined 
by the withdrawal from the Comintern in November 1923. The Comintern‘s interference in 
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the Party‘s inner affairs was unacceptable for the majority of the DNA-members who 
supported Martin Tranmæl‘s position on this issue and voted for the disaffiliation from the 
Third International. Furthermore, the greater concentration of power in Moscow and the 
demand for discipline scared those representatives of the Party who remained the members of 
the DNA after the split in 1923.   
6.4. The self / other nexus: inclusion and exclusion of the Russian Other  
In 1915—1923 the self / other nexus was changing and developing. It can be compared to a 
pendulum that swung either to the self-side or to the other-side dependent on the editor and 
his opinions. Prior to and during the February Revolution, the Norwegian Self appeared 
inclusive towards the Russian Other as the latter promoted the end of the war and democratic 
development in the country. The October Revolution and its brutality tilted the balance 
towards the exclusion of the Russian Other. In 1918—1921 the Norwegian self actively 
sought to the inclusion of the Russian Other. In 1921 there was a tendency to include the 
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